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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This briefing note considers the European Commission’s proposals for a common European 
spectrum policy through reviewing adopted legislation as well as recent communications and 
other initiatives. The report was produced against the background of the review of the 
regulatory framework for electronic communications and the recent World Radio-
communication Conference. 
Radio communication, both broadcast and ‘two-way’, is one of the great technologies to 
emerge during the 20th century. The promise of radio spectrum technology, however, is still 
largely unrealized. Innovation has been limited by large politically connected players, mainly 
broadcasters and incumbent telephone companies. Policy has been driven by well-intentioned 
regulators with restricted vision of the possibilities, encouraged in some cases by vested 
interests and governments in need of new sources of taxation. The result is a wasteful use of 
the spectrum based on an artificial scarcity. 
Looking at the history of spectrum management in Europe over the past sixty years or so, the 
national, regional and international system has been a good basis for managing the spectrum 
in times of limited demand. However it is institutionally biased towards the incumbent users 
of the spectrum. The objective is to protect existing users and their technologies from 
interference rather than to optimize the economic and social value of spectrum use. The major 
impacts of such a policy are now restrictions on innovation and growth. 
The process of spectrum management in the EU today is spread across the Member States and 
their NRAs and certain parts of the Commission. There is major involvement of regional and 
global bodies such as CEPT and the ITU, as by its very nature spectrum management cannot 
be considered in European or national isolation. In consequence, today’s management 
processes are lengthy, sometimes arbitrary, often politicized and always somewhat 
fragmented. Based typically on worst-case theoretical scenarios, there is little consideration of 
the real world, no systematic empirical testing, no economic impact assessment for trade-offs 
or risk analysis, and no cognizance of future trends in demand for radio services and 
technologies. The result is a glacial rate of change in policy in the EU and across the world 
The development of a coherent EU spectrum policy has become a policy priority only after 
1998, though steps had been undertaken to harmonize certain bands for pan-European 
services since the late 1980s (GSM, ERMES, DECT) with mixed fortune. In the current 
regulatory framework adopted in 2002, the Framework Directive refers to the promotion of 
‘efficient use’, harmonization and effective management of radio frequencies with allocation 
and assignment, and states that Member States may make provisions for undertakings to 
transfer rights to use radio frequencies, and ensure that competition is not distorted as a result 
of any such transaction; whereas the Authorization Directive specifies the essential 
requirement of avoiding harmful interference, the exceptions to the general rule that spectrum 
use should be only subject to conditions included in general authorizations, not to individual 
licences; and the imposition of fees for these rights. In addition, the Radio Spectrum Decision 
introduces a complex architecture of decision making, involving the Commission, the Radio 
Spectrum Policy Group (advising on policy measures), the Radio Spectrum Committee and 
the CEPT (intervening in technical implementation measures through mandates).  
Despite efforts to promote the use of market-based assignment and unlicensed spectrum in 
Member States through soft law instruments (mostly, Communications), spectrum policy 
remains mostly subject to national competence. In February 2007, the Commission 
announced measures to promote flexible spectrum management and the reorganization of 
some bands. 
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These include: the accommodation of mobile multimedia services together with broadcasting 
services in the UHF band; the allocation of 900 MHz and 1800 MHz bands also to 3G 
services in addition to GSM (e.g. UMTS); the opening of the 1.9-2.1 GHz band, currently 
allocated to UMTS, also to broadcast services; and the use of the 2.6 GHz band and the 3.4-
3.8 GHz band for broadband wireless access technologies (such as WiMAX).  
Most recently, in the recently adopted Communication on the digital dividend, the 
Commission announced the adoption of a binding Community law instrument to establish 
‘application clusters’ in common spectrum bands in the UHF band, which would form the 
basis for future national and EU-wide plans. In addition, the proposed Directive amending the 
2002 regulatory framework introduces technology and service neutrality as binding principles, 
and enhances the importance of spectrum tradability, strengthening the Commission’s power 
to take implementing measures via the comitology procedure to coordinate the application of 
the new principles for internal market purposes. According to the Commission proposal, a 
newly established European Electronic Telecommunications Market Authority would assist 
the Commission in facilitating access to spectrum by coordinating or harmonizing the 
conditions applicable to individual rights of use. 
This report concludes that the reforms proposed are good as far as they go, but they need 
certain changes and some additions. Reforms given in the policy documents cited in Chapters 
1, 2 and 3 are aimed at building a new regime for spectrum usage with the key proposals 
being: 
• A ‘harmonized’ view of spectrum management: This means bringing 27 different national 
spectrum management schemes into line. Why this useful is well explained – a single 
spectrum regime returns technology and services benefits to users and thus economic and 
social and benefits (e.g. in volume production of standard equipment, lowering prices and 
the barrier to entry for new users). How it could be done is yet to be clearly sketched out 
although it seems that current NRA regimes with a central regulator would be involved. An 
appropriate overall EU structure is explored in Chapter 1 including a central spectrum 
management co-ordinator. We also see gaps in defining transition routes that are clear and 
practical. A progressive transition of the reforms is the most likely to succeed, not a ‘big 
bang’ but with Member States being kept in synchronism in a co-ordinated fashion. 
• Flexibility in assignment of spectrum to a specific technology or services: This implies 
that if a band is being used for broadcast, its function could be swapped, e.g. for e-
communications. Or, if a licensed band is used for, say, 3G UMTS cellular mobile 
technology, it could also be used for WiMAX (a metropolitan area broadband technology). 
At present such flexibility is either non-existent or limited by Member State. 
• Allocation methods: The flexibility described above should also be expanded on in terms 
of the allocation methods. The Commission seeks to add market-based trading with 
secondary trading and auctions to the traditional method. By traditional we imply a 
managed administration or command and control allocation for privileged organizations. A 
key gap here for Europe’s future is the progressive addition of far more unlicensed bands, 
to form a commons for all users based on newly emerging technology. Innovation in radio 
technologies would benefit from fast and unfettered access to spectrum as they already do 
for the 6% (or less by country) of the spectrum given over to licence-exempt bands. New 
uses such as WiFi, BlueTooth and WiMAX depend on this. Ideally what is needed is to 
establish an unlicensed commons, Europe-wide and internationally. Re-allocation of 
existing commercial spectrum usages might be combined with Member State 
governments/international bodies as initial donors. Usage conditions and governance 
mechanisms for a commons would be light as control for interference relies on equipment 
tests.  
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Underlying this challenge to current use of the spectrum by ‘single frequency’ technologies 
are several signal processing innovations, some very new, some older but just coming into 
commercial use. All depend on the availability of high computing power at low cost, which 
we now see in everyday consumer products such as mobile phones and video game 
players. The new sharing approaches may employ a range of techniques, either to overlap 
transparently, or to interleave on white spots, and/or to re-use licensed bands when they are 
momentarily unoccupied. Approaches to radio communications based on high 
computational power precipitate a new model of management of the spectrum, which 
focuses on the right of anyone to communicate and also on the transmitting/receiving 
device conforming to interference limits. It takes us away from property rights or the 
granting of permissions to privileged users, and towards the computer industry’s form of 
usage and attitude to the spectrum. 
• But more than this, Europe needs reforms of the actual spectrum assignments among 
users – the whole of the usable spectrum needs to be reconsidered, but some parts more 
particularly owing to their advantages in terms of network costs. The Commission’s 
proposals certainly support this reform but are unclear on objectives and concrete 
proposals. Moreover, the EU has a one-time opportunity with the switchover to digital TV 
offering the potential for large swathes of spectrum to be re-assigned. This prime spectrum 
(in the UHF range) offers far longer range propagation and building penetration for high 
bit rate services. 
• From a legal and regulatory perspective, the feasibility of the reforms announced by the 
Commission finds important constraints at international (ITU) and regional (CEPT) level, 
and even more importantly at national level. As regards international commitments, the 
primary allocation granted to broadcasting services under the GE-06 agreement is currently 
being discussed in the WRC-07, where the Commission is proposing to grant a co-primary 
status to mobile multimedia services. This passage would be key to unleash the full 
potential of the digital dividend, as services enjoying only a secondary status must comply 
with the interference envelope designed for broadcasting services, nor can claim protection 
in case of interference with a primary service. In addition, a recent amendment to the MA-
02 arrangement has added flexibility to the use of the L-band, currently used for digital 
audio broadcasting services. At national level, our survey of four Member States revealed 
the existence of important constraints, especially in those countries where existing, 
burdensome licences expire in many years from now (as is the case for 3G in some 
countries), and where the government still uses key bands (e.g. the 2.5 GHz band). 
Surveyed countries have – to very different extents – taken action towards a more efficient 
usage of spectrum, with older Member States typically relying mostly on administrative 
models exhibiting the most significant constraints, compared to countries where market-
based models have already been launched, and also new Member States, where the 
conditions for more flexible spectrum usage appear rather favourable. Overall, our findings 
suggest the need for coordination between Member States, facilitated by an EU body, to 
achieve more flexibility in spectrum usage, thorough reorganization of key bands, and 
establishment of the conditions for a Europe-wide unlicensed spectrum commons.   
In summary, the EU needs to rapidly move on to better forms of spectrum management which 
combine openness, flexibility and harmonization while re-apportioning the spectrum 
completely. This would be a key step towards the achievement of the internal market for e-
communications, as well as a strong driver for European competitiveness and growth. The 
proposed reforms do attempt to move in this direction to some extent. For the EU to be a 
competitive contender in the ICT industries, however, better use of the spectrum than is 
suggested in the reforms so far is vital. 
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1. ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMISSION’S PROPOSALS ON SPECTRUM REFORM   
1.1 Expected impacts of the proposed reforms and chances of success 
1.1.1 The history of spectrum usage and future potential significance 
Technological foundations for usage of the spectrum 
The management of the radio spectrum1 serves key policy goals for Europe, primarily of 
delivering the information society, and through that the targets for jobs and growth of the 
Lisbon agenda. Radio transmission is one of the great technologies that emerged during the 
20th century. Spectrum dependent services already directly bring an estimated €250 billion 
per year to the European economy2. Today’s spectrum use has grown from early uses of radio 
transmission for communications by Morse code, by voice from the 1890s and then the first 
public radio broadcasts in the early 1920s. These applications were all based on 19th century 
radio research by the likes of Tesla and Marconi, with broadcast television from 1928 led by 
Logie Baird and others.  
A basic principle of spectrum management, until very recently at least, has been that all 
transmissions need their own specific frequency or continuous band of frequencies (apart 
from some military applications). Since interference occurs with two transmissions on the 
same frequency, management of the spectrum is needed to assure one usage over any other. 
This leads to a doctrine of spectrum scarcity, which means that spectrum must be managed 
with every wireless system needing an exclusive licence from government to operate. This 
doctrine has suited most governments throughout most of the 20th century, allowing them to 
reserve spectrum for military purposes and also to exercise control over radio and television 
broadcasting. If spectrum is scarce, enlightened governments have a justification for ensuring 
that broadcasting media are pluralistic; similarly, it is easier for undemocratic regimes to 
manipulate the media for propaganda purposes.  
The historical regulatory landscape 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, national regulators for radio spectrum have set 
national rules. These have been guided by agreements at an international level by the key user 
bodies: the ITU (telecommunications and other usages), EBU (broadcasting in Europe), IMO 
(marine communications) and ICAO (civil aviation) with bodies such as CEPT speaking for 
national regulators and suppliers plus a wider range of concerned bodies and specialists (e.g. 
Eurocontrol for civil and military air traffic control). In this context of a patchwork of 
frequency usage, with some EU-wide and international agreements, the public/government 
services and the military have maintained their hold over large portions of national spectrum.  
Policy in Europe has generally been a national concern, driven by well-intentioned but 
broadly conservative NRAs who have largely maintained the status quo. Traditionally, 
spectrum has been managed through an administrative process (sometimes known as 
‘managed or administered command and control’) based on the notion of scarcity. The 
spectrum manager decides on both the use of a particular band and on which users are 
allowed to utilize each band. This was appropriate when there were fewer uses, and users, 
plus an establishment that was difficult to challenge, stifling new demands for spectrum. 
                                                 
1 The radio frequency spectrum is only a comparatively small part of the electromagnetic spectrum, covering the 
range from 3 Hz to 300 GHz. 
2 Ofcom, communication, October 2007. 
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The application of market principles has begun to emerge in some jurisdictions over the past 
decade or so with spectrum being assigned through auctions. The notion of spectrum sharing, 
however, has largely been seen as illusory, owing to interference, or has been portrayed as a 
science fiction of the future.  
Growth of spectrum applications 
In the 21st century, a major expansion in applications in e-communications is occurring, as 
radio is the focus of great innovation. The promise of radio-enabled ICTs is finally beginning 
to emerge. Demand has started to exceed supply under the traditional regime and 
governments cannot ignore the economic benefits that accrue from efficient use of the 
spectrum. More responsive spectrum management is now required to ensure Europe keeps 
pace with technological changes and maintains its place as a world leader in the 
communications sector. In these circumstances, a growing number of influential voices are 
recognising that current regulation is the problem, not the solution, including parts of the ICT 
industry, the RSPG, some NRAs and some members of the ITU. The key question all these 
groups are asking is:  how can we unlock the power of spectrum? 
In response to this question, a well-known general concept is taking hold, of a conversion 
from using the terrestrial airwaves for broadcast TV and radio programming to their use for 
two-way e-communications3. In complementary manner, all forms of broadcast entertainment 
may increasingly be carried over cable TV and satellite, and perhaps even mobile channels. 
Some Member States, such as the Netherlands, have moved away from broadcast TV almost 
entirely into national coverage by CATV networks. Consequently, as we advance into the 21st 
century, the telecommunications industry as whole becomes the radio-communications 
industry, whose major service revenue portion is in mobile services. 
Future usages and their needs 
New applications for radio technology are being driven by expanded use of business and 
consumer ICTs and their needs to communicate. They are driven by social and economic 
trends such as the aging demography in Europe and the rising costs of healthcare, as much as 
the take-up of radio-enabled ICT products. Thus we see the growth of medical applications, 
for instance the move to accommodate patients in their home, and experiments with sheltered 
housing for the elderly and frail. Underpinning this is expansion into broadband wireless 
services. The use of short range technologies (i.e. one to a few metres) is exploding, from 
Bluetooth and its successors for headsets to ultra wide band (UWB) for home video networks. 
They include RFID for logistics and retail sectors, with many other future applications. These 
consumer and business uses are all dependent on unlicensed bands. Thus we may identify 
future potential demand trends for spectrum resulting from applications in: 
• Broadband wireless for media as well as e-communications, both mobile and fixed. 
• Healthcare and social service radio networks. 
• Enhanced and EU-wide public emergency services for the increasing incidence of 
natural catastrophes with climate change and large-scale man-made disasters (Bohlin 
et al, 2006b, Annex 2). 
• Low power applications such as RFID for logistics and consumer home networks 
(ITU, 2005). 
• Satellite communications and broadcast. 
                                                 
3 This principle of bandwidth exchange was sometimes referred to as ‘the Negroponte switch’ in the 1990s. 
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• Expanded scientific uses. 
• Digital TV (both standard and high definition). 
• Mobile TV. 
1.1.2 Current status and key trends in spectrum policy and its related areas 
Where are we in spectrum management today? 
Increased demand, convergence of media and communications and the need to facilitate more 
rapid access to spectrum to promote innovation and competition are driving more market-
based and flexible approaches to spectrum management in the EU. In order to achieve optimal 
use of this ‘scarce’ resource, the European Commission is seeking to continue this process. 
Policy goals are to give spectrum users greater freedom over how spectrum should be used 
and by whom, by removing barriers to entry and applying only the minimum necessary 
regulatory constraints.  
One approach has been property rights rather than ‘permission’ for trading slices of the 
spectrum like land, commodities or other natural resources. Member States such as Germany 
and the UK have moved the furthest, using spectrum auctions since the late 1990s, following 
Coase (1959) and later developments (Benzoni, 1993). Trading some of the radio spectrum in 
specific bands like a commodity is currently permitted in only a few Member States, but 
would become legal throughout the EU under the Commission’s proposals. This would 
establish a secondary trading market with prices being set by the forces of supply and 
demand, following on from the primary sale into the market. Liberalising spectrum access 
through truly open markets would invite new players and current competitors to take market 
share from the established users. Moreover, the importance of regulators could diminish if 
such private – and independent – markets can be established to allocate radio spectrum in all 
Member States.  
An alternative and more radical approach is to permit unlicensed spectrum bands for anyone 
to use – the basis of the ‘commons’ in spectrum. This concept and its variants such as the 
‘supercommons’ hold that spectrum is not a commodity, and is certainly not scarce, but rather 
is just misallocated (Werbach, 2004). So regulatory proposals based on the spectrum being a 
physical asset, defined in bands of frequencies, artificially constrain exploitation as a common 
good. Extensive use of a commons approach depends on new radio technology to enable far 
more sharing of the spectrum and so refocus radio regulation away from the spectrum itself 
and towards the devices used for communication – the position of the computer industry 
rather than the telecommunications sector.  
The commons approach considers that real ownership is not possible as spectrum is not 
concrete – there is no such tangible thing as spectrum, it is only an intellectual construct. 
Analogies to land or to natural resources eventually break down and should be replaced by a 
universal communication privilege. Limits should be set by technical approval tests and 
liability mechanisms to effectively prevent interference. These commons concepts could 
operate in unlicensed bands alongside the property and managed command and control 
regimes. Allowing unfettered radio communication could theoretically overcome scarcity to 
maximize capacity. Unlicensed bands, initially for instrument, medical and scientific 
applications, have expanded slightly in some Member States, but still generally take less than 
1% of the spectrum below 1 GHz. The various approaches to spectrum reforms are 
summarized in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: A simple view of the options for spectrum reform 
Source: Geiss, 2004. 
Key policy t 
rends emerging 
Expansion of the EU’s strongly consumerist economy is putting more and more pressure on 
policy makers to reconsider spectrum allocation with expansion of market and commons 
principles.  
The telecommunications industry is expecting more spectrum to be available for mobile 
services and fixed wireless access, released from two sources. First is the TV media broadcast 
industry, with the switchover from analogue to digital TV. Broadcasting going digital should 
release 75% of the current analogue broadcast spectrum to other uses, and so it is termed the 
‘digital dividend’. 
A second source is expected to be the ‘refarming’ of public services and military spectrum, be 
it in moving to new technology, e.g. for civil aviation radars, and in new positions in the 
spectrum with narrower bandwidth as well as reducing military requirements. It may take 
financial incentives to encourage state organizations to value and recycle their spectrum 
assets, retaining only what they really need when using more efficient new technology. 
Progress to a single market in the EU has also driven demands for a harmonized approach to 
spectrum management across Member States, although that may not be an explicit demand for 
ordinary citizens, only being expressed in pressure for lower prices. Convergence of different 
regulatory regimes across the EU means commonality in: 
• Freedoms of usage (in service type or in technology – e.g. WiMAX for 3G mobile). 
• Rights to usage. 
• Bands for each type of usage 
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Economic significance of spectrum for tomorrow’s society 
The economic significance to the EU resulting from use of the radio spectrum should not be 
underestimated. It is now a primary economic input factor on which our technology-based 
lifestyles and infrastructure increasingly depend. 
Over the past decade, dependence has expanded dramatically with focus for communications 
shifting from fixed to mobile for the majority of the EU population. The GSM market in the 
old EU-15 generated €15.6 billion in 2004 and accounted for 2.8 million jobs,4 greater than all 
agriculture, and also greater than the combined value for the EU-15 of the public utility 
industries (gas, electricity and water).  Table 1 gives estimates for indirect and direct impacts 
in the EU arising from the use of the spectrum, for the two largest spectrum-dependent user 
sectors. 
Table 1: Economic impacts of spectrum use on the EU economy for mobile and TV broadcasting 
 Mobile TV 
Operators – service provision €208 billion 
(2007) 
€43 billion 
(2005) 
Suppliers/distributors – hardware 
(handsets), software, networks, content 
€87 billion 
(2007) 
€30 billion 
(2006) 
Direct 
Economic output per MHz at 900 MHz €168 million 
(2006) 
€28 million 
(2005) 
Economic stimulus of mobile working, 
cumulative driving effect of mobile 
productivity to 2020 
0.6% GDP 
growth 
Negligible Indirect 
Indirect stimulus to the economy by spend 
of direct impact revenues in other sectors: 
– User surplus, social and economic 
value, i.e. difference between what paid 
and prepared to pay 
– Producer surplus, i.e. difference 
between margins to stay in business and 
margins actually achieved 
 
 
 
€165 billion 
(2007) 
 
 
 
€95 billion 
Employment in sector 0.5 million 0.4 million Jobs 
Employment stimulated by spend from 
sector 
2.3 million 1.8 million1 
Source: Forge et al, 2007. 
1.1.3 Technical and organizational constraints and barriers at EU and MS levels 
Technical constraints – forming the basis for spectrum management today 
Technical spectrum management revolves around the principle of avoiding interference. This 
is mainly applied by allotting one user to one frequency band. However transmission at a 
single frequency using an oscillator locked to that frequency inevitably produces some effects 
of both a spread of frequencies and the possible emission of ‘side bands’ – harmonics of the 
original centre frequency, both higher and lower up the spectrum. These effects depend on the 
type of signal generation in use, antenna characteristics and their overall effect of the 
transmission power.  
                                                 
4 Ovum, 2004. 
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To some extent these side effects can be filtered out before the power stage of transmission 
using various types of slot filter which only give window of passage to the desired frequency.  
However, some spread of the centre frequency as ‘skirts’ may be inevitable, despite the 
efficacy of modern digital filters. Thus the second key for technical spectrum management is 
the use of ‘guard bands’ between different users, a dead space where the interfering spread 
can decay.  
The effect of guard bands is to reduce efficient use of the spectrum enormously – they just 
add dead space. Their widths are a technical question of how sharply the signal filtering can 
attenuate the skirt and the sidebands of the desired transmission signal, a transmitter as well as 
a receiver problem. Understanding how the spectrum is actually used is therefore becoming 
far more important, as detection of unused licensed regions in even dense urban settings can 
been measured. This shows that perhaps as little as 5-10% of licensed bands are actually 
being used at one time, and less in rural areas so that rural flexibility for the digital divide 
could be envisaged (see Dettmer, 2005, p. 44; McHenry, 2005). 
Some tolerance of other signals may be possible, in that they appear as part of the background 
noise which is present at all frequencies, if their power levels are low. Future directions for 
regulation have been considered in the USA: in 2003, the FCC sought comment on the 
feasibility of implementing a so-called ‘interference temperature’ model for quantifying and 
managing interference. 
Organizational limits and political constraints  
Legacy ownership of spectrum and usage restrictions will be exceedingly difficult to shed 
across the EU. It is reinforced by the international Radio Regulations, agreed both worldwide 
and at regional level, e.g. by the WRC-07 and the RRC-06 (e.g. its DTV broadcast 
agreement).  
Nevertheless, the major problem for the EU lies close to home and results from the 27 
Member States.  Each owns and regulates spectrum individually and each NRA is confronted 
with specific national conditions (economic, cultural, geographic, demographic) and 
priorities. Furthermore, change is global and moves at a glacial speed – for instance, 
preparation for WRC-07 began in 2003. Any reforms face considerable resistance from 
existing users with established services and businesses, as well as from governments 
themselves. Moreover, the latter may see spectrum in terms of confiscatory taxation, and so 
may introduce their inertia of political constraints.  
However, spectrum policy should not be driven by short-term budget policy, as in the USA, 
which has consistently set the timing and scope of spectrum auctions to align with potential 
budgetary deficits (Tramont, 2005). In addition, such revenue pressures cut out any 
willingness to promote a spectrum policy of unlicensed bands. Thus reluctance to promote a 
commons by some governments, which they claim are for technical reasons, needs to be 
viewed with scepticism. One should ask whether it is the finance ministry that is setting 
spectrum policy. In the UK with £22.5 billion was raised in carefully orchestrated 3G auctions 
but at what cost? The damage to technology development, roll-out and marketing from tax 
gathering may be said to have limited, perhaps halted, the whole European 3G industry 
(Forge, 2004). Moreover, presence of government licensees can also distort spectrum reform 
effort buy auctions, e.g. in the USA in the 800 MHz proceedings in 2004.  
On the pricing of licences for newly released spectrum, there are several models for the initial 
release. A number of EU Member States price the licence based on the principle of covering 
administrative costs. Some EU countries such as the UK have been making greater use of 
incentive based spectrum pricing to set licence fees since the late 1990s. Not only is incentive 
pricing used for commercial applications but it is also being applied to an increasing amount 
of public sector holdings of spectrum (e.g. spectrum used for defence purposes). 
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It is also worth looking at the history of others who have pursued intrusive policies with a 
market-based approach. For example, in the USA, the FCC may have learnt lessons on how 
spectrum policy should not be managed from the PCS auctions of the mid-1990s which 
reserved a ‘set aside’ of two blocks for small businesses – the legal tangle of the heirs to that 
spectrum is still being resolved a decade later. Similarly, FCC intrusion has limited distance 
learning and fixed wireless services. 
If a market-oriented approach is taken for some bands then all the rights need to be put in the 
marketplace as rapidly as possible, and users not charged extra for each degree of flexibility 
in the licence and ownership rights. 
There are also some users with strong agendas who expect no changes, perhaps with 
justification. For example, civil aviation in Europe, through the Spectrum Frequency 
Consultation Group (SFCG), co-ordinates spectrum strategy through the WRC-07 for aviation 
in Europe under Eurocontrol. Safety is of course the priority – overall it must have the 
bandwidth necessary for air traffic control to function5  – and so requests adequate allocation. 
The telecommunications industry itself sees advantages in spectrum reform6, especially in 
cheap new bandwidth, although for secondary trading, they see problems of transaction costs. 
1.1.4 Substance of proposals – Directives, Communications, relevant policy papers 
A number of documents on spectrum reform have been produced covering: 
• Building a framework for spectrum management in Europe with a range of 
proposals, some being fairly simple extensions of today’s situation of shared powers 
at EU and Member State level, some more radical such as a European regulator for 
spectrum management. With this comes: 
o A harmonized approach across all the EU for regulation of the spectrum 
o Flexibility in allocation by service and technology type for rapid access  
• Market-based forms of regulation with secondary trading for spectrum licences, 
usually first offered through  some form of auction 
• Future mobile services and their spectrum requirements 
• The digital switchover from analogue to digital TV and its digital dividend 
• Collective spectrum use in the sense of overlays and interleaving 
Discussion of regulatory issues in the area of spectrum is set in a combination of adopted 
legislation and recently adopted and planned initiatives. The most relevant pieces of 
legislation start with the R&TTE directive of 1999, the regulatory framework for electronic 
communication and the spectrum decision. Also relevant are replies to requests for comment 
on the major reforms as well as some studies carried out for the European Commission7. The 
major relevant documents are listed and summarized in Table 2.  
                                                 
5 Eurocontrol, Response to request for comments on ‘Study on conditions and options in introducing secondary 
trading of radio spectrum in the European Community’, 14 September 2004. 
6 GSM-Europe, GSME response to the final report for the European Commission ‘study on conditions and 
options in introducing secondary trading of radio spectrum in the European Community’, 17 September 2004. 
7Analysys, 2004; Forge, 2005; Mott MacDonald, 2006. 
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Table 2: The major documents relevant to the spectrum reform proposals. 
Document Reference / Title Substance 
Directive 1999/5/EC. Radio 
equipment and 
telecommunications terminal 
equipment (R&TTE) and the 
mutual recognition of their 
conformity  
The R&TTE directive – initial framework for electronic communication 
markets and spectrum decisions. Establishes the EU market through a 
regulatory framework for the placing on the market, free movement and 
putting into service in the EU of R&TTE conforming technically to 
standards assuring non-inference over the range 9kHz to 3000GHz, with 
protection of users and all others. Allows use of mutually agreed EU-
wide harmonized standards for all States. Radio equipment for public 
security, defence, State security excluded.  
Decision 676/2002/EC. Radio 
Spectrum Decision (RSD) on a 
regulatory framework for radio 
spectrum policy in the 
European Community (“The 
Radio Spectrum Decision”) 
Key EC policy decision to establish an EU framework to coordinate 
policy/ legal approaches as harmonized conditions for availability and 
efficient use of the radio spectrum, as the basis for establishment and 
functioning of the internal market, in EC policy areas such as e-
communications, transport and R & D. Establishes procedures for policy 
making – strategic planning and harmonization of use of radio spectrum 
COM/2007 /50 final, adopted 8 
February 2007. Rapid access to 
spectrum for wireless electronic 
communications services 
through more flexibility 
Main policy document to establish a more flexible spectrum 
management approach, reducing spectrum scarcity and costs, termed 
WAPECS (Wireless Access Policy for Electronic Communications 
Services).  Aim overall is to accelerate access to spectrum, based on 
efficient management. Changing spectrum usage freely is valued at €8–9 
billion per year. The basis for this approach is service and technology 
neutrality, as defined usages block opportunities for other usages. Notes 
that 1350MHz of spectrum could be flexibly repurposed, using technical 
criteria to limit interference (power levels, guard bands, channel ID).  
EC Directives 
2002/19/20/21/22/and 58. This 
series of directives establishes 
rules of operation of e-comms 
services and networks8  
19: Freedom of access, or interconnection, without restrictive practices 
20: The Authorization Directive – proposes minimal authorization rules 
21: The Framework Directive – common regulatory framework 
22: Covers universal service, user rights for availability, affordability etc 
58: The Directive on Privacy – personal data and protection of privacy 
COM(2005)411 final, of 6 
September 2005. Second annual 
report on Radio spectrum 
policy 
A forward-looking radio spectrum policy for the EU to harmonize 
spectrum for good of EU society. Considers need for common policy 
and regulation for spectrum markets, transition to DTV etc– in 
consideration of the high impacts on EU economy – e.g. GSM revenues 
and jobs. Notes failure of 3G auctions with 109Bn Euro spend. Notes 2 
approaches to allocation – markets and commons – and new applications 
of spectrum 
COM(2005)400 final, 14 
September 2005 A market-
based approach to spectrum 
management in the EU 
Policy document describing how market should decide on use of a 
spectrum band following Framework Directive 21 (2002) which 
considers trading.  Would apply for selected bands to be owned under a 
licence – states that a third of the spectrum below 3GHz could be 
tradable. EC could initiate co-ordination process using the RSD – to 
have all in place for 2010. Still sees a place for managed command and 
control for public sector. Notes market based reforms already active in 
Member States – AT, DK, HU, IT, NL, PT, SK, SI, SE, UK. 
 
                                                 
8 Following EC obligation under Art 8 of Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the 
internal market for telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision (ONP), 
OJ L 192, 24.7.1990, p. 1. Amended by Directive 97/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 
295, 29.10.1997, p. 23) 
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Document Reference / Title Substance 
COM(2004)507. Radio 
spectrum policy in the 
European Union: State of 
Implementation and Outlook 
First annual report on Radio spectrum policy under the RSD. Discusses 
specific actions to strengthen spectrum policy: on 3G mobile, RLANs, 
UWB, SRDs, etc; policy for digital dividend, 2ndary trading, WRC-07; 
international activities; future wireless platforms.  
COM(2005)461 final, 29 Sept 
2005. Policy for Radio 
spectrum availability in context 
of digital switchover and 
upcoming ITU Regional 
Radiocommunication 
Conference 2006, (RRC-06) 
Describes EU priorities for the RRC-06 meeting to discuss plans for 
terrestrial digital broadcasting frequencies (174-230 MHz & 470-862 
MHz). Usefully notes that 3 to 6 times less radio spectrum needed – so 
some 300 to 375 MHz could be freed. Also could make broadcasting 
bands tradable. Requests EU-wide harmonization of dividend and 
commitment to swift switchover (by 2012) with need for common 
action. 
“Towards a European policy 
on the radio spectrum” EP 
Resolution of 14 February 
2007, P6_TA-
PROV(2007)0041 
European policy on the radio spectrum from EP. Considers EU needs to 
adopt a sustainable approach to spectrum which will promote 
competition and the development of innovative technologies, inhibit the 
hoarding of frequency rights and the aggregation of monopolies and 
benefit consumers, and that this approach should take into consideration 
technological change as well as the needs of market players and of 
citizens. Emphasizes importance of spectrum has increased during recent 
years and that the growth of the technology sector relies, inter alia, on 
the efficient use of spectrum. Responded to Commission 
communications, COM(2005)400, a market-based approach and 2nd 
annual report COM(2005)411. 
Decision 2007/344/EC, adopted 
16 May 2007.  
Harmonized availability of information regarding spectrum use in the 
EU – MS to use ERO information system (EFIS) on spectrum data 
COM(2007)371 final. The ITU 
World Radiocommunications 
Conference: WRC-07 
preparation, following Lisbon 
agenda, i2010, for a European 
Information Society for 2010. 
Call by EC for MS to maintain common negotiating positions during 
WRC-07 and support positions identified by EC, endorsed by CEC and 
EP, specifically- consolidation of EU single Market; removal of 
technical barriers to international trade; promotion of competition 
between alternative infrastructure platforms; innovation-friendly 
conditions for new technologies, including via open standards.  
RSPG policy input documents, 
specifically, Opinion of the 
RSPG on WAPECS – the EU 
policy for radio access to e-
comms services  
Describes an EC policy for platforms for radio access to e-comms 
services for any spectrum band and any technology. Sets out a long-term 
vision for equitable competition between such platforms offering similar 
services and addressing similar markets.  Aimed at a more flexible 
spectrum management approach but co-ordinated on an international 
basis with other regulatory bodies. Proposes removal of constraints on 
usage of radio spectrum bands where possible. Concerned with spectrum 
reform in a coherent way for new e-comms bands across the EU with 
flexibility by all MS. Vague on real objectives and deliverables so far. 
EC Decision 2007/344/EC, 
adopted 16 May 2007  
Harmonized availability of information regarding spectrum use within 
the EC. MS to use ERO information system (EFIS) on spectrum data 
COM(2007) 13 November 
2007, not final, Reaping the full 
benefits of the digital dividend 
(DD) in Europe: A common 
approach to the use of the 
spectrum released by the digital 
switchover 
3 main candidates for the DD – 1.Wireless broadband communications   
2. Additional terrestrial broadcasting services (somewhat specious 
argument on participation) 3. Mobile multimedia, (and surprisingly 
mobile TV). Proposes DD division into sub-bands for Uni-directional 
services) broadcast and bi-directional (e-communications, e.g. 
broadband mobile). NO unlicensed reservation. 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/radio_spectrum/index_en.htm. 
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1.1.5 Implications of key proposals 
Major directions expected for the future of spectrum usage and management in Europe 
In these policy papers and directives the EC has made a framework for moving forward to a 
generally better spectrum regime in terms of allocation and level of management specifically 
with recommendations that include: 
• A common framework for spectrum decisions: the general major thrust towards 
consistency across Europe on spectrum assignments with an  expectation of economic 
penalties if universality is not met, as spelled out in the Markets paper, COM(2005)400.  
• Neutrality on services: specific services are chosen today for each band – for instance 
broadcasting has large reserved bands, especially in the range up to 1GHz, the prime 
region of spectrum that broadcasters wish to retain. 
• Neutrality on technology: generally when a service has been chosen for a band, the 
actual technology in use may well be specified, especially for mobile services, such as 
GSM or UMTS. Liberalization of spectrum away from assigned usage by technology is 
more efficient. The EC has identified at least 1350 MHz that could be used for new 
purposes if complete flexibility is permitted (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Bands on the run – open to review for neutral service usages  
Band for potential re-use Frequency range, in MHz 
Digital dividend, analogue TV 470 – 862 (total of 392 MHz) 
GSM Mobile  880 – 915 and 925 – 960,  also PCS 1710 – 
1785 and 
1805 – 1880 (total 220) 
UMTS/3G 1900-1980, 2010-2025, 2110 – 2170 (total 
155) 
IMT 2000/3G still to be licensed, the “2.6GHz” 
band 
2500 – 2690 (total 190) 
Broad band to customer premises, also satellite 
channels in Africa and Russia, at 3.4GHz 
3400 – 3800 (total 400) 
Source: from COM / 2007/50. 
• A market-based approach to allocation, allowing secondary trading: letting the market 
decide on use and values of spectrum. Markets become the major mechanism of 
spectrum allocation reform, through trade in specific authorized bands. This key 
proposal is outlined in COM 400, 2005. It suggests assuring efficient coordination at 
Community level, by introduction of markets for the bands listed below: 
o Terrestrial mobile communication services, including frequencies for public 
mobile services, such as GSM and 3G, and those for closed user groups, e.g. PMR 
and PAMR. 
o Terrestrial fixed wireless communication services, including frequencies for 
Wireless Local Loop, Broadband Wireless Access and microwave links. 
o Terrestrial TV and radio broadcast services – local, regional and national. 
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It notes that actual bands to trade would have to be validated with a coordination process 
needing specific legislative proposals, based on impact assessments. Also the costs of 
having a market-based entry for smaller operators should be considered, especially to 
avoid spectrum hoarding and/or driving prices beyond the economic value to a small 
operator (with the aim of limiting competition, after which the market price of services 
could be revised to recoup overpayments).  
Optimistically, the bands listed above might be expected to function on a market basis 
rapidly. Reassignment of the released spectrum from the digital dividend could boost 
efficient use of these bands, although the dividend might be far better managed through 
other models9. A commons of unlicensed bands is the obvious solution. Hostility in 
some Member States to this is likely, due to governments anticipating lost auction fees, 
or regulatory capture by operators interested in protecting their mobile licence 
investments, and of course mandated users of the managed command and control 
portion, who would not wish to relinquish spectrum for a commons. 
• Flexibility: Neutrality on technology and services means that spectrum could be used for any 
purpose. But caution may be necessary. In practice, some bands may need to be reserved for one 
application across the EU (certain military or emergency services, for instance). There may well 
be bands where a general class of application could be set, but implementation would be open, 
e.g. for commercial broadcast, implementation might be terrestrial broadcast, but if technically 
suitable, digital satellite with a restricted footprint might be a contender. Here the notion of sub-
bands becomes useful, i.e. division into commonly agreed areas for flexible and non-flexible 
usage. 
• Harmonization across the EU Member States: a single EU market for mobile services could 
create one of the largest markets globally for such services10. There is therefore much mileage 
for the EU in moving to harmonized standards for allocation methods and types of usage of 
bands in terms of the split between commercial and public/military services and the release and 
refarming of spectrum. This does not mean that flexibility disappears, just that the same degree 
and dimensions of flexibility and freedoms should be applied across the EU. This applies 
equally to public access EU radio spectrum information, with uniformity of access to 
comparable and accurate information on spectrum use and regulation via a single reference point 
having been mandated by the EC11. It does imply an EU-level of agreement. Whether it implies 
an EU regulator is a moot point. 
• Management of the regulatory process: in connection with the latter issue above, the move from 
NRAs as key deciders to a central authority may make some sense in the case of a harmonized 
EU spectrum management. For spectrum to be of economic benefit to all, it can no longer be a 
subject for independent local decisions, especially if a licence-free commons and perhaps 
markets for licensed bands are to be allowed to operate. Also it would relieve regulators of 
redundancy and conflicts in rulings while reducing parallel resources and effort to make the 
rulings. Instead, one central body sets the agenda and the rulings. Impacts of new EU-wide 
policy are likely to be better supported by strong coordination at a single point, perhaps more so 
than can be effected by the ERG12, although this group may be quite adequate, in concert with 
EC guidelines, for other aspects of telecommunications regulation.  
                                                 
9 ‘Accelerating the Transition from Analogue to Digital Terrestrial Broadcasting’, SEC(2005) 661, p. 10, staff 
working paper; and COM(2005)204. 
10 A market-based approach to spectrum management in the EU, (2005)400 final, 14 Sept 2005. 
11 EC Decision 2007/344/EC, on harmonised availability of information regarding spectrum use within the 
Community, adopted 16 May 2007. 
12 European Regulators Group, the collective body of NRAs which currently coordinates policy between 
Member States, http://erg.eu.int. 
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• Overall implications for Europe – The recommendations for a European strategy to 
harness the opportunities of spectrum are largely useful as far as they go. Major areas 
that do need revisiting are now considered, in sections 1.2 and 1.3. 
1.2 Who wins, who loses – SWOT analysis of key reforms proposed 
1.2.1 SWOT analysis of key proposed reforms 
The main impacts of the current proposals are considered in the tables below: 
Table 4: Concepts of spectrum assignment in current proposals. 
Strengths 
• Continuity with the past 
• Satisfies current users with 
conventional concepts of usage –
military, TV, emergency services 
etc and those with single-user 
licences. 
Weaknesses 
• The conventional view of spectrum assignment as being 
exclusive usage of a discrete frequency band requires 
either a managed allocation or a licensed model. This is 
likely to hinder new entrants and restrict new 
technologies for sharing spectrum and using it more 
efficiently. 
Opportunities 
• A single market for technology, 
pan EU services and content. 
• Introduction of neutrality on 
services and technologies enhances 
economic potential 
Threats 
• Conventional view of spectrum usage may halt 
development of new radio technologies for mobile and 
other non-cellular communications, both in R&D and 
bringing into service – both sharing and interleaving 
technologies. So innovators (researchers and service 
providers) offering novel technologies, infrastructures 
and services would lose out. 
 
Table 5: Spectrum allocation methods proposed (market-based, with command and control 
still). 
Strengths 
• Opens up usages and owners to the 
market rather than just officials 
• Market-based mechanisms of 
allocation may well be useful for 
some applications such as DTV, so 
more flexibility would be 
introduced for some commercial 
players and their industries. 
Weaknesses 
• Not looking forward to new types of usage e.g. mobile 
Internet 
• Based on yesterday and today’s views of allocation.  
• Secondary market operations in the EU have been 
limited 
• US experience of markets in spectrum has been mixed  
• Secondary trading will require administration of owners, 
rights and usages updated in real time with trading 
• Trading could lead to speculation and hoarding 
requiring regulator vigilance, with an EU and a national 
level of awareness to protect smaller market players 
Opportunities 
• Open up spectrum to new uses in 
some MS through markets and 
auctions 
• Establishment of secondary trading 
markets 
• Secondary trading could introduce 
higher competition in some 
markets 
Threats 
• Only pursuing command and control and market based 
implies either a mandated privilege or funds to purchase 
a licence – unfair to smaller players and minority 
interests (lack of government lobbying power) 
• Without inclusion of more unlicensed allocation, uses 
will be restricted to those with resources to compete and 
those with mandates to use. New technologies using the 
WiFi model of free and open access would tend to be 
restricted 
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Table 6: Impacts of neutrality in technology and services.  
Strengths 
• Drives innovation in technologies 
as they can be deployed more 
easily. 
• Enables service providers to enter 
markets far more easily using the 
spectrum available 
Weaknesses 
• Reduces chances of EU-wide harmonization. 
• May lead to market led rather than social-value services. 
• Technology neutrality may encourage many standards 
with less chance of economy of scale, interworking and 
roaming 
Opportunities 
• Easier entry for service providers 
with novel offerings will promote a 
thriving competitive market 
• Choice for users is greater 
Threats 
• May increase chances of interference unless well 
managed – e.g. with constantly updated central 
spectrum registry for the EU 
 
 
Table 7: Impacts of EU harmonization and centralization of spectrum regulation. 
Strengths 
• Gives an EU wide conformity for 
users and regulators, removing the 
patchwork of legal, technical and 
commercial conditions for 
awarding and using spectrum. 
Weaknesses 
• May require much negotiation to arrive at a suitable 
balanced structure, with clear identification of roles of 
each participating body at EU and MS levels – a lengthy 
process. 
• Tends to limit role of NRAs to national issues other than 
spectrum – e.g. forms of universal service in view of 
national income and needs 
Opportunities 
• Build an EU-wide market for 
services and equipment with 
simplification of support for users 
– e.g. a single mobile numbering 
plan 
Threats 
• A strong EU central body, rather than a facilitator and 
coordinator, would be a single point of pressure for 
political influence by MS governments lobbying for 
special interests. 
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1.2.2 Conclusions from SWOT analysis 
The key conclusions 
A summary of the major impacts of the policy proposals for trading and technology and 
service neutrality is given in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Impacts of policy proposals for trading and neutrality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Smura et al, 2006. 
The implications of the proposed regulatory policy for the basic concepts of assignment with 
EU-wide harmonization and centralization of spectrum are shown in Figure 3: 
Figure 3: Impacts of proposals for harmonization, EU-wide regulation and basic concept 
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1.2.3 Main implications 
Overall the Commission’s proposals imply a significant improvement over previous spectrum 
management. However, several questions remain over whether the proposals go far enough. 
The first is whether more emphasis should have been given to the potential for unlicensed 
bands rather than market-based allocations of only a relatively small part of the spectrum. 
Second, should more spectrum have been considered for re-allocation, especially as a result of 
the digital dividend? Third is the question of whether this is being carried out at the risk of too 
much centralization of power in a way that could be performed equally well or better at the 
local, NRA, level. 
On the first two questions, we have to look at the socio-economic implications. The promise 
of spectrum-based industries for Europe will be realized to a limited extent by the current 
proposals. Older technologies have already taken most of the prime spectrum, i.e. that at the 
lower frequencies below 1 GHz with low and questionable future socio-economic value. So 
there is a crucial need for spectrum reform as the value to society and the EU economy of 
spectrum has increased dramatically since the first European agreements were made. 
1.3 Gap analysis and likely impacts on demand for spectrum 
1.3.1 Major areas missing or requiring further attention  
New thinking on spectrum usage – a commons in spectrum 
The analysis above implies the need for more than just better mechanisms of allocation. 
Rather, what is needed is complete reassignment of usages of the existing spectrum. For 
example, the prime spectrum (in the UHF range) offers longer range propagation and better 
penetration of buildings for lower cost, high bit rate services. But it is unclear whether current 
proposals will deliver this. Advanced technologies and their spectrum needs deserve far more 
consideration than is currently the case. 
On the question of centralization, to achieve harmonization with flexibility of the liberalized 
spectrum, a greater degree of coordination will surely be required. However, a large 
bureaucracy is not what is necessary. Instead, a central facilitator is likely to be more 
successful, coordinating the Member States, working with NRAs in a more direct way than 
today, and above all quickly and decisively to review questions of harmonized authorizations. 
The aim would be to accelerate the rate of change in regulation at national, European and 
world levels. 
Perhaps the largest area missing is anticipation of technology to expand spectrum usages in 
the future by sharing using technologies explored in section 1.3.2. This implied that a 
commons in spectrum is probably going to be required. Using the most advanced technologies 
(only completely exploited by the military today), each transmission would be transparent to 
other users, and if allowed, could use already allocated unlicensed bands. For the thinking 
here it is useful to refer to recent literature on different concepts of the nature of spectrum 
which see it as an abstraction, not a saleable good so that property rights no longer apply (e.g. 
Benkler, 2003; Werbach, 2004).  
It would accompany a change of model of spectrum usage that has yet to be seriously 
considered by the European Commission (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Radio spectrum policy impacts: commons and unlicensed bands against markets 
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across the EU in harmony. While assuring harmonization, they should also introduce reduced 
technical constraints for greater technical flexibility. They must also operate with several 
management models, not just command and control and market-based (and secondary trading) 
but also spectrum sharing, commons and unlicensed bands at assignment level. Will 
traditional spectrum management methods alone suffice for these new technologies? Current 
spectrum management frameworks to some extent already provide for competing mechanisms 
and for limited spectrum sharing. But novel definitions of user rights are required to reflect 
new degrees of flexibility for shared access to frequency bands and for concepts of secondary 
and primary users. Some technologies considered below may offer novel spectrum sharing 
between peer users as well as primary and secondary users. Spectrum sharing with secondary 
users implies that a regulatory spectrum agency would have to provide a novel legal 
framework for secondary usage and trading secondary rights.  
 
Market based
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with ownership 
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A regulatory agency should also:  
• Set technical conditions on secondary use on interference, e.g. spectrum masks for 
interleaving, or noise levels (e.g. similar to the FCC’s ‘interference temperature’). 
• Police the frequency bands for spectrum sharing, having identified them, with a 
central registry of users and rights for licensed users and trading partners. 
In contrast, verification for commons users in unlicensed bands should be performed at the 
equipment conformance level, simplifying authorization and eliminating the regulator’s load 
beyond type approval testing. However, all such novel sharing techniques are at an early 
stage, making it difficult to predict impacts on spectrum management and exactly what 
supporting technologies would be needed. More sophisticated spectrum sweeping equipment 
will be needed if dense usage of the spectrum is to be maintained. It could provide constant 
monitoring at low cost as a first step, surveillance of trends and alarms for over power-limits 
detection, and in some situations, user identification. 
1.3.2 Consideration of emerging technical developments and their impacts 
What we are seeing is a rapid change in the way transmitted signals are handled as new 
technologies and techniques for communications via the radio spectrum are brought to 
market. These all depend on low cost digital signal processing requiring relatively high 
computing power that has only recently become available at handset level in terms of cost and 
power. The main technologies and techniques that will change how the frequency spectrum 
may be allocated are explored briefly here: 
Software Defined Radio/Cognitive Radio (SDR/CR): over the last decade, far greater flexible 
configuration of the air interface has appeared. SDR grew out of the need for far more flexible 
(‘intelligent’) radio receivers and transmitters, units whose transmission frequencies and other 
characteristics could be changed at will, i.e. under software control. Pioneered in Europe and 
the USA in the early 1990s, initially for digital audio broadcast (DAB). Use of SDR is 
essential for the next stage of such thinking on intelligent adaptability in which the ambient 
radio spectrum is tested (or ‘sniffed’) continually to identify unused areas of spectrum for re-
use, perhaps for a very short time. First publicly researched from about 2000 on, this is often 
termed cognitive radio (CR) as the transceiver is aware of its radio spectrum environment and 
so can dynamically adapt its transmission/reception behaviour and characteristics 
accordingly13. It allows temporarily free spectrum, or small gaps between used bands (‘white 
spaces’) to be re-used. Alternatively in a market-based model the spectrum might be rented 
for the moment it is used and then released for others14. Such techniques depend on the 
finding that perhaps only 5-10% of the licensed spectrum at any one time is in use, across 
urban, suburban and rural environments. ‘Interference’ problems only appear if a CR cannot 
find a legitimate free band as it jumps from one vacant frequency to another. In summary, this 
real-time spectrum management of CR is useful at two levels – as part of a general spectrum 
management regime for higher efficiency in utilization and secondly for deploying a market-
based charging approach, with (preferably) pre-negotiated access among co-operating users – 
those who ‘own’ the spectrum and those who wish to ‘borrow’ it, for a short time.  It has led 
to the term ‘collective use’ implying a licence exempt basis, e.g. for short range devices 
(SRDs), as well as sharing concepts such as underlay and overlay.  
                                                 
13 See e.g., FCC notice, ‘Facilitating opportunities for flexible, efficient, and reliable spectrum use employing 
cognitive radio technologies’, Notice of proposed rule making and order, FCC 03-322, ET Docket No. 03-108. 
14 FCC , Comments of Shared Spectrum Company: In the Matter of Inquiry Regarding Software Defined Radios 
, June 2000,  ET Docket N0. 00-47, Shared Spectrum Company, Vienna, VA. 
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Here users would have no or only partial protection from interference in terms of legal 
recourse against interfering users. Collective use is open to all applications and technologies if 
they comply with the relevant technical parameters.  
Spatial multiplexing using Multiple-input, Multiple-output (MIMO) systems. Using multiple 
antennas both at the transmitter and receiver to improve air interface performance offers 
significant increases in data throughput and link range with no extra bandwidth or transmit 
power. MIMO achieves this by higher spectral efficiency, i.e. more bits per second per Hertz 
of bandwidth and better link reliability or diversity – reduced fading. MIMO is a central 
theme for radio research and standards setting currently. Various radio systems including 
cellular (3GPP/3GPP2), WiMAX and WLAN (WiFi15) exploit it commercially now or plan to 
in 2008. The next step is to exploit its spatial diversity further, for more users per cell.  
Mesh and ad hoc networks. Mesh networks exploit the users’ terminal devices acting as a 
base stations or relay for other users (Forge, 2004). They can thus extend a network or set it 
up just by the presence of a user who is in range of other users. So mesh networking may 
create ‘new’ networks in an ad hoc fashion, a feature making them attractive for emergency 
services. Moreover their more flexible network architectures may co-exist with like and 
unlike networks. Their very nature indicates use of shared spectrum, and so licence-exempt 
bands. They could be used for delivering present services and also could exploit less used and 
less valuable spectrum (e.g. beyond 5 GHz for short ranges). Moreover, mesh networks could 
link different licensed operators, acting as a relay between their frequency bands to carry a 
single service between different spectrum holders. 
Spread spectrum: This term covers a range of very different techniques (Sterling, 2007) some 
of which have been around for over seventy years and have illustrious inventors (e.g. Hedy 
Lamarr). The concept is to not use one frequency but many in various configurations to avoid 
interference at one frequency, or detection, or jamming. Its future impacts for radio 
telecommunications could be fundamental in that ‘direct-sequence’ spread spectrum 
substitutes bandwidth for power, transmitting over a wide spectrum, with low power at any 
one frequency. A simple form is used in the CDMA mobile system based on military research 
from the 1960s, and is also employed in 3G mobile, under the name Wideband-CDMA in 
Europe. Ultra wideband communications (UWB) also fall into this category, although many 
suggested uses are more towards short range, high data rate usage. Such technologies could 
use unlicensed bands or if truly successful could use any band, in that they are transparent to 
other users when suitably engineered. Their impingement on other users is then a legal licence 
infraction rather than technical interference. For truly successful future spread spectrum 
systems, regulation of their use of the spectrum could be problematic due to their invisibility, 
except for failures involving amplified signal strength. 
Compression: coding of digital signals in less bandwidth is a common practice today. 
Reduction of bandwidth required can be significant, as long as there is enough computing 
power in the terminal device to decompress the incoming signal in real time or near real-time, 
e.g. for display. Current compression (and fast decompression) ratios vary between typically 
three and up to 10 times and more, highly significant for limiting bandwidth needs and so the 
demand for spectrum. Standard protocols such as the MPEG series for graphics and video use 
compression, as do advanced mobile cellular protocols over the air interface. It comes into its 
own for high bandwidth applications such as a TV programmes (and for download storage). 
                                                 
15 The 2006 IEEE 802.11n, high-throughput standard. 
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Bit rate encoding: one of the major decisions over reassignment of bandwidth is how much 
would be needed by an operator to provide a complete service. Closely linked to the 
principles of compression above is the encoding form used for digital signals when 
transmitted. The number of bits per Hertz of bandwidth is always greater than one, and with 
modern techniques is conventionally five and can go be as high as 25. The impacts of this are 
crucial for spectrum reform. It means that a 100 Mbps data stream can be encoded in 20 MHz 
of bandwidth, for a 5:1 ratio and in 4 MHz for a 25:1 ratio. 
1.3.3 Digital dividend opportunities  
Political agendas of the main protagonists and their relative political power 
The switchover to digital broadcasting is as much a political issue as a technical one. Today, 
analogue broadcasting dominates the radio spectrum – and is inefficient. It uses spectrum as 
being free or very cheap. Also it uses a key band – the 470-862 MHz band – optimal for both 
long range of propagation, which reduces network costs, and for penetrating buildings, for 
better indoor reception and transmission. Switchover to digital TV from analogue promises a 
saving of at least 75% of its spectrum, possibly more, which could be freed for other 
purposes. On the re-use of this 75% currently we see a major division in the EU between the 
public broadcasters and other commercial users. Broadcasters would like to re-use the entire 
released spectrum for more digital channels, effectively seeing it as theirs of right. The 
telecommunications world sees it as a key opportunity, for a mobile industry ‘mid-life 
kicker’, and as a chance to close the digital divide in the EU with a fixed radio broadband 
local loop. The use of the 700 MHz UHF spectrum instead of a 2.4 GHz (unlicensed) or 2.6 
GHz band would reduce network infrastructure costs enormously. Cell radii at 700 MHz are 
more than 100% larger than comparable systems at 2.6 GHz. As a result, the required number 
of base stations is reduced by more than half. Analysis of a wireless internet service provider 
(WISP) shows that using spectrum below 1 GHz would need about 1/3 fewer base stations 
and about 50% of the capital investment of a WISP using the 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz bands (Open 
Spectrum UK, 2007, p 20). Also, indoor antennas are feasible in the digital dividend’s bands, 
enabling a ‘plug and play’ solution, whereas at 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz professional installation is 
typically required.  
However, broadcasting is a powerful and influential lobby (see Starks, 2007), which 
governments do not want to upset – touch TV and you touch popular sentiment. And so the 
political power of broadcasters is enormous, far greater than that of any other player including 
the mobile network operators (MNOs). Broadcasters argue that their public service role means 
that they should not be subject to normal market considerations. However, the real question is 
not the scale of social value from television but, rather, it is whether the airwaves should be 
the delivery mechanism when alternatives are increasingly available.  
The broadcast paradigm of the past is less relevant to the future because a plethora of other 
platforms can deliver content: cable TV; satellite; also IPTV over fixed xDSL/FTTH; and 
Internet media downloads for non-IP TV from the Web. Many fixed line operators are 
investing in NGNs with broadband capabilities. Mobile TV may appear either as cellular 
channels or as broadcast elements. Fixed wireless broadband and mobile can carry TV. Note 
that the lead country worldwide for IPTV in 2007 is France, provided by the incumbent telco, 
France Telecom, with some 0.5 million users, over its broadband networks.  
The case for investment of spectrum in broadcast TV is weak on economic grounds. It will 
not create as many jobs and wealth as investing in mobile spectrum allocation. New mobile 
TV, IPTV, etc might even drive display devices more. This would include the content and 
programming as well as technology for: TV products (media recorders/ players, DVD players 
and disks, MP3 players, etc); network distribution; cable television, etc. Consumer electronics 
would continue to flourish with mobile usage of much of the spectrum.  
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Investment in mobile via the digital dividend would seem to be a more promising way 
forward for Europe. The mobile contribution to productivity and GDP from investment in 
telecoms and especially mobile is much greater than anything else (see Table 1). 
The outcome will depend on discussions between three parties – the Member States’ 
governments, European Parliament and the European Commission on the one hand, the 
broadcasters, led by the EBU, and the mobile industry, supported by the GSM-E forum and 
CEPT. As the EBU and individual broadcasters are increasingly firm over the retention of the 
spectrum for DTV, the opportunity may be missed. 
Impact of HDTV on the digital dividend 
Several factors affect the bandwidth needs of HDTV. First, compression ratios and the 
standards available have become more efficient over time and will continue to do so. 
Compression algorithms in five years time may be expected to be even better than today, and 
claims of 10 times better than the first DTV standard, MPEG-2, have already been made for 
proprietary schemes.  
Second, the bandwidth demand required by uncompressed HDTV is also a moving target, 
with estimates of broadcast spectrum required varying with technology, image resolution and 
time, from 6 MHz up to 20 MHz. Thus claims on bandwidth for HDTV should be treated with 
some care. Bandwidth required may be set at arbitrary, possibly exaggerated; levels that may 
not be necessary in future even for the maximum image resolution as technology progresses. 
It should also be noted that platforms other than DTT (such as cable or satellite) may be better 
suited to DTV and HDTV especially. Furthermore, broadband communications to the home 
(e.g. via radio local links, or fixed) can deliver streaming channels of HDTV, as IPTV or in its 
original HDTV format, as well as Internet and voice communications. This would reduce the 
need for broadcast, generally, and broadcast HDTV. 
The above implies that with four HDTV channels per analogue channel, the digital dividend 
could be around 75% of the approximately 390 MHz analogue spectrum, i.e. some 290 
MHz16. However this figure may be disputed in the knowledge that a future expansion of the 
number of possible HDTV channels may be expected, as technology advances, if more 
bandwidth is reserved now for broadcast, and bandwidth per channel shrinks. Arguments that 
this is needed because the technology is not yet that efficient should be treated with care.  
1.4 Flexibility v harmonization and implications for authorization 
1.4.1 Flexibility in authorization desired by Member States 
The two basic options are a centralized EU level regulator for spectrum and the current 
system devolved to NRAs. We now consider each case: 
The case for delegation to Member States: The case rests on the concepts that the current 
system works well. The regulators under the European Regulatory Group (ERG) claim to co-
operate constructively and are sensitive to encroachments17.  
In many areas they may be correct, such as implementing universal service, or addressing 
VoIP, although often following common guidelines from the Commission. In some areas such 
as international roaming charges they did little, however. Perhaps too few are really politically 
independent, either from governments and/or industry incumbents (fixed or mobile). 
                                                 
16 This is confirmed in a recent report for Ofcom (ZetaCast, 2007). 
17 See Richards, 2007, and also response from the Commission (Turton, 2007). 
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The case for strong harmonization: For radio-based e-communications, a single market would 
bring the fruits of common pricing, numbering plans, perhaps higher competition and lower 
prices in services and handsets. From the consumer and business user point of view it would 
simplify travel and use of services if there were no patchwork of regulations. For common EU 
emergency services, it would also be advantageous for cross-border working, volume 
production of equipment etc and compatibility in accessing other ICT resources (e.g. 
databases of hazardous goods).  
Moreover the non-interference model of spectrum usage requires a strong central manager to 
agree bands across the EU, especially in a market-based system. Here, spectrum rights holders 
may be of quite different sizes and so will have varied economic and political power – the 
smallest may get squeezed (out). Independence and transparent rule would be essential for 
any centralized body but ensuring this is the case is likely to be challenging. 
1.4.2 Possibilities for median solutions 
What does the median solution imply and what are the potential options? An overall approach 
may be to use the RRC and WRC to negotiate major guidelines (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5: A median solution for a regulatory structure 
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The European Commission might then set the framework for harmonized bands across the EU 
within the regional agreements, including unlicensed bands. The commons model would give 
the maximum freedom in authorization of various usages of spectrum in each Member State – 
unlicensed bands are the most useful in terms of flexibility and authorization, which would be 
at a level of technical conformity. Thus political median solutions could turn on technical 
parameters. 
Within the agreed bands, the NRAs then assure the discipline of local users and police 
conformance. This would place the EC in a coordinating rather than a policing role, which 
may well suit it best. 
Flexibility and the concept of the spectrum commons  
Service flexibility will give the chance to let the market decide on which part of the spectrum 
is used for what. Moreover, technical flexibility does not exclude the possibility of 
harmonising frequency bands and standardising technology. 
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However, it leaves the harmonization of services (and frequency bands) and standardization to 
the market. It is still unclear today as to whether markets will lead to efficient use of 
spectrum. Their real openness is obscure, as is the market knowledge of potential players. 
On the other hand, reduction of technical constraints for greater flexibility may facilitate the 
evolution of novel e-communications or broadcast technologies from one generation to 
another. For example, allocation of spectrum for digital broadcasting without specifying the 
technology makes it possible to improve transmission techniques without delays for 
regulatory decisions at each stage. What is needed is a balance between a potentially highly 
regulated new world of more complex spectrum sharing and the ideal of no regulation. The 
latter case is where the unlicensed commons has much to offer. We now look at these options: 
Collective use 
The technical summary (section 1.3.2), briefly reviewed the collective use of spectrum via 
CR/SDR technology in the sense of interleaving, low power overlaps and borrowing when no 
one else is using the frequencies in licensed bands. The collective approach provides a clever 
way of living with the existing, without disturbing it too much, although some existing users 
may be perturbed by the concept of temporal or frequency interleaving and borrowing, even 
under regulated market (paid for) conditions. This approach is also highly relevant for short-
range applications. But it does not go as far as what may be required for the enormous 
expansion in radio-based applications we can expect over the coming decades. 
Significance of the spectrum commons in regulatory and innovation terms 
As noted, the present regulatory framework for radio spectrum management needs to be 
revised for new technology. Shared spectrum in a commons could provide far more users with 
access, with many different services and at minimal cost in that no spectrum licence fee is 
paid – the computer industry model. Different uses would be able to share the same spectrum, 
effectively overlapping, combining the flexibility of advances such as CR/SDR with new 
techniques for spread spectrum.  
This is a far more flexible approach than a licence to use spectrum. It draws on usage 
privileges that do not presuppose ownership but a universal communication right instead. It 
simplifies regulation enormously. Such a regime also allows freedom to innovate within 
technical limitations on interference. The commons approach refocuses wireless regulation 
away from the ether as scarce transmission medium and towards the devices used for 
communication. It rests on a more forward-looking, non-discriminatory spectrum 
management, which is effectively passive. It thus encourages innovation both in the 
underlying technology and in content of all kinds, through the freedom in carrying content. 
Implications for the future European economy 
In such a situation, with part of the spectrum freed for unlicensed use, competition could 
thrive between mobile and other actors and technologies in these unlicensed bands. This 
assumes that new technology for overlapping usage is developed and takes off across global 
markets, not just the EU, to give the pricing of volume production.  
Strong competition could then ensue in every sector – TV/radio, mobile, etc – but the range of 
applications may increase. Market forces with no obligations on operators to conform to 
market and service definitions for radio spectrum use and conditions of operation (e.g. 
coverage and bandwidth definitions) would result in advantages for all end customers, 
removing market distortion by powerful incumbents. Operators would have greater freedom 
to introduce innovative services. Greater competition would drive universal coverage of new 
services, such as mobile broadband, avoiding ‘cherry-picking’ of dense urban sites which 
increases the digital divide. Such a scenario of freedom of use fits well with mobile as the 
broadband gateway to Internet services. 
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This would give a major incentive for European software developers to produce applications 
and utilities and leave behind the fragmented mobile application and network world of today. 
1.4.3 EU wide recommendations on spectrum management 
Key recommendations 
The proposals set out by the Commission meet some goals that will generally be beneficial 
for Europe, but that there are some gaps, so that we recommend: 
• More centralization of decision making could make sense, especially to assure 
harmonization by ensuring that Member States follow guidance on neutrality at 
technology and service levels. This would also ensure flexibility rules in assigning uses 
are followed. An orchestrated solution for Europe would help to implement the 
rebalancing of DTV, military, satellite, public services, merchant marine and civil 
aviation, against mobile e-communications for consumer and industrial purposes. 
• The concept of market approaches to allocation should be taken seriously, but as one 
possibility among several. In some cases, markets may be a temporary mechanism 
and/or of limited application. The technology now under development will change the 
sharing possibilities. Governments may prefer auctions as a way of generating taxes 
while the market mechanism gives a veneer of liberalization. But real stimulus to the 
economy may come from free spectrum, both in ease of use and cost with newer 
technology. Competition rules would have to be applied to markets to prevent hoarding, 
and might have to be streamlined for rapid action. So instead of just markets, wider 
unlicensed bands at lower frequencies (400 MHz-1 GHz) would enable the 
establishment of a commons for new long and short-range technologies and for far more 
innovation, brought to market rapidly. The ISM band (Instrumentation, Scientific and 
Medical) band could become part of a larger set of commons bands. 
• The digital dividend should be used primarily for mobile and radio communications 
technologies rather than terrestrial or satellite DTV, as it will bring far greater economic 
leverage for the EU. Part of this could form the commons. The question then posed is 
how much should this be – the better the sharing technology, the less is needed. But if 
all technology progresses in this direction over the next few decades, switching over 
from legacy radio technology would indicate a progression of steps in wider bandwidth, 
rather than a single big bang. The digital divide could also be addressed by mobile usage 
of the spectrum especially in rural areas, and wherever development of broadband 
services is still hindered by limited infrastructure competition. 
• Bandwidth should also be earmarked for new collective emergency services for the 
increasing rates of natural disasters (floods/fires) and man-made (radio-active and 
chemical leakages/petrol terminal explosions/ terrorism) enabling ad hoc networks to be 
set up as well as European level networks involving all emergency services, hospitals, 
disaster centres, etc. Here the notion of equipment using the commons comes into its 
own as the most flexible way forward for coordinating nomadic, mobile and fixed 
resources. EU sector policies already act here and should be coordinated, including 
Public Protection and Disaster Relief (PPDR) for cooperation in civil protection, Galileo 
positioning satellite for navigation, under a ‘Single European Sky’ and GMES (Global 
Monitoring for Environment and Security) the core environment and security 
programme. 
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2. THE PAN-EUROPEAN SERVICES QUESTION   
2.1 The concept of pan-European services  
2.1.1 Services across Europe 
Concepts 
In examining the future of Europe in terms of its spectrum use, the anomaly that crossing a 
border implies new uses of spectrum is fast becoming questionable. National services are the 
norm today even for spectrum uses which have a common baseline agreement – such as the 
900 MHz and 1800 MHz mobile cellular GSM bands, as national borders rule for 
implementation of the services.  Thus the concept of a single common set of services across 
Europe is increasingly attractive. 
This concept can be seen in two alternative lights: 
• First, the need for common spectrum uses across the EU, for instance for new e-
communications services such as MSS (Mobile satellite services) and mobile 
communications from aircraft (MCA). This is the conventional view of pan-European 
services. There may be less opportunity for common terrestrial and broadcast services 
from one provider across Member States due to language barriers. However 
standardization of frequency bands for DTV and satellite in technical frequency terms 
across the EU will become necessary to enable other spectrum users to operate EU-wide 
services. These are subjects under discussion in WRC-07, and subsequent conferences 
and will also be a future Regional Radio Conference (RRC) item. Note that certain e-
communications and also TV (entertainment) services might be delivered via a 
broadband fixed wireless local loop not just a mobile network and this will also require 
considerations for a harmonized approach. The current bands already reserved 
internationally for WiMAX and the unlicensed spectrum for WiFi are a starting point 
here, with re-use of UMTS (3G mobile) bands. 
• Second, as a common pan-European implementation of services, possibly only the most 
important e-communications services, rather than national varieties. This would apply 
primarily for mobile services but could also to some extent be for broadcast terrestrial 
and satellite TV entertainment (if copyright restrictions on the content allow 
international coverage). This will enable provision of a pan-European network of 
information services, which will become more important in the future as mobile Internet 
access ushers in a range of new radio-based usages. 
Impacts 
The impacts of current national orientation are fragmentation, effectively bringing total 
market size down to national level for mass consumer services. This gives operators the 
chance to extract new scarcity rents for their services, while limiting their market reach in 
some cases. One instance of the manifestation of such inefficiencies is in the excessive 
international roaming charges for the EU, which the European Parliament struck down in its 
near unanimous Plenary vote in May 2007. Fragmentation in spectrum usage by Member 
State means that adopting new EU-wide uses for any part of the spectrum is long, painful and 
costly. 
For mobile services, crossing a border means changing to new numbering systems, new 
charges, new ranges of services on offer and even in some cases, new user interfaces for 
advanced services, all of which tends to limit take-up. 
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Building a single market for radio-based services is thus limited by the regulatory regimes, 
which the NRA largely decides on. So, interestingly, some national regulators may not see the 
need for an EU-wide approach as much as end-users. 
Requirements 
Such a concept requires Europe-wide agreements by all Member States on common uses of 
spectrum not just for those services that touch consumers but for rebalancing the spectrum 
across all the types of users, especially military and public services. This would mean not just 
collective EU agreements for civil marine and aviation uses, as we have had for over sixty 
years but also for emergency services and most difficult, military. 
For the market-based approach to spectrum management, it might introduce the concept of a 
new type of licensing that covers multiple, adjacent Member States, and may even be EU-
wide for the first time. This would tend to displace some of the current licensing for 
commercial mobile and broadcast service on a national basis – some TV satellites with 
overlapping footprints effectively do this. It would tend to overturn current spectrum licensing 
regimes, which enforce national territorial markets.  
For this to happen inter-government agreements on licence fee sharing would be required, a 
minefield that might profit from some central guidance – perhaps an EU framework of fair-to-
all financial rules.  It also introduces the principle of the use of auctions at EU level to award 
spectrum for pan-European services – for instance an immediate candidate might be a pan-EU 
auction to award spectrum for the new service proposed at 2 GHz for Mobile Satellite 
Systems (MSS). However, removing a national tax harvest and installing a shared EU scheme 
may well be as problematic as changing the traditional scheme and its players’ attitudes: it 
would be quite difficult. 
It also raises the question of an EU-wide regulator to manage and monitor EU-wide services 
and spectrum alignments. But this may only become necessary if agreements at NRA level are 
impossible to reach effectively, so that either a ‘light touch guiding hand’, or alternatively, a 
strong regulatory body is seen as necessary to effect change. 
Use of pan-European services at EU-external borders  
With coordination of Member States more as an EU entity, the EU will slowly form a sizeable 
block of common spectrum uses, which neighbours may wish to join. Certainly at the outset 
of a spectrum replanning exercise for common EU spectrum policies and usages, the impacts 
on neighbour states should be evaluated. In general, there are two reasons for the neighbour 
states to be interested in a changing EU regulatory regime and its spectrum assignments: 
• Interference with their existing services due to signal coverage overlap beyond borders, 
interrupting national services, perhaps owing to new frequencies and higher signal 
powers being used, especially for mobile services. The impact may occur up to 20 km or 
even more into the neighbour state, depending on technology and frequency of 
propagation. 
• The arrival of pan-European services, which might be of interest to neighbour states. 
They may have a wish to benefit from pan-European services, especially if they offer 
cheaper international rates and more advanced services. This is more likely to be the 
case, wherever there are strong trading ties (e.g. Norway, Switzerland, accession states 
to the EU such as Croatia and Turkey, some of the former Soviet republics, and North 
African states such as Morocco). 
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Naturally the existing international regulatory bodies should be the fora for discussion and 
resolution of theses issues. Thus there are two major policy options: 
• Bilateral agreements, which are effectively commercial deals, extending pan-European 
services using carriers on either side who agree to reciprocate on relaying services. 
Networks could either be at different frequencies for the same service, or the neighbour 
state could revise its spectrum assignments. For users, this would mean either that 
common spectrum agreements on assignments must be in place beforehand, or 
multimode handsets are made available, probably mostly in the neighbour state.  
• Or, negotiations on interference resolution and/or for pan-European services extension 
may occur through the Regional Radio Conference, and also perhaps the ITU (WRC 
series). A single agreement with all neighbour states at once would be optimal, if at all 
possible. As always this depends on the willingness of neighbour states to act in concert. 
2.1.2 Service provider types and opportunities 
Market contexts and types of service provider 
Tomorrow, if trans-EU services become the norm, then the build-up of supra-national 
operators offering common services across all Member States could become more likely – if 
licences became available on an EU basis, a seemingly unlikely premise today for the reasons 
given above. But it could introduce a new type of MNO – truly integrated across Europe – 
rather than separate licences and services by Member State. It would remove the handover 
between mobile service providers and the accompanying series of financial and technical 
changes between national territories.   
Opportunities across the EU for service providers 
Thus the commercial context could change from national-only coverage to multi-Member 
State, up to EU coverage, for all types of commercial radio services. Trading could also 
introduce arbitrageurs, depending on licence resale rules. If secondary trading of spectrum 
received a common EU–wide set of rules, or even light guidelines, then their market in buying 
and selling spectrum could well expand. Special interest vehicles, perhaps financed by those 
with excess capital such as private equity players, may appear as such a business is essentially 
capital intensive.  
The major markets that could evolve in such an EU-wide eco-system would be of several 
types. Primarily there would be markets in value added mobile services, as explored further 
below, and second would be provision of the content for such services. The model for such a 
mobile market could be the Internet but transcribed into the mobile world with users able to 
access mobile-enabled websites for transactions, entertainment, communications, navigation, 
etc, and perhaps even services with social value such as health and education. 
Impacts of new services in economic terms 
The impetus of mobile working could act as a strong catalyst for the EU economy owing to 
the externality effects of its workings on all sectors of the economy. Table 1 showed the 
various impacts which could produce a progressive increase in the EU economy driven by the 
mobile productivity factor of an estimated value of €330 billion by 2020. 
2.1.3 Selection process and authorisation of pan-European services 
The selection process for pan-European services must come from the market – it is not for the 
EC or the NRAs to define commercial offerings. Governments have a poor track record 
picking winners in a fast moving commercial market. 
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However, there may be a role in applying certain attributes for efficient market operation such 
as: 
• support for a Europe-wide numbering scheme for mobile services 
• setting limits on common call termination charges between carriers, especially where 
a distorted market may arise 
• assuring common tariffs across Europe for pan-European services (i.e. they do not 
differ by Member State), which could also eliminate supplementary roaming fees – 
the inter-operator termination charge for interconnection would be all that would be 
required 
• assuring privacy and security measures for such services are implemented. 
Authorisation of pan-European services could well be a discussion between regulators at EC 
and NRA level: 
• to authorise EU-wide operation by assuring that the bandwidth required is available 
in order to operate  
• to assure that there is competition in this market segment.  
However, against this is the argument that assuring that there is competition poses a dilemma, 
as perhaps no other offering will be made. Thus the alternative seems preferable, that pan-
European services are entirely market-driven. There is no interaction by the regulator in their 
authorisation per se. The regulator’s role is passive because the market decides. 
The key issue associated with a passive role for the regulator is that spectrum may not be 
assigned and there are several options here, shown in Table 8. 
Table 8: Options for spectrum allocation for Pan – European Services 
Option Advantages Difficulties 
Reserved bands of licensed 
spectrum common across all 
EU Member States 
Licenses can be auctioned 
(or beauty contest- less 
desirable for a healthy 
market) 
Difficulty of arriving at 
agreement on specific band -
long term negotiations may 
be required (2-5 years), 
especially if at RRC and 
WRC levels also 
Difficult for new services and 
entrants to enter if all taken 
Entry process for new service 
may be lengthy 
Reserved band of unlicensed 
commons across all EU 
• Easy to enter 
• Easy to start new service 
• Fast entry once set up 
Difficult to get agreement on 
specific commons band 
Must have strong rules on 
technical specifications over 
interference 
 
IP/A/ITRE/ST/2007-04
 
                        Page 27 of 69
 
                           PE 393.521
2.2 Types of services and their requirements 
2.2.1 Overall classification 
Main types of services today and tomorrow (to 2020)  
A study for the Commission on future mobile services and markets (Forge, 2005) looked at 
applications for consumer and business (i.e. civilian) radio-based services at the level of 
needs, most of which could fall into the pan-European category. It then converted them into 
demands for spectrum by analysing their content and network characteristics, with the aim of 
mapping them to the ITU traffic classes for the WRC-07 deliberations. The study identified 
over 130 services including internal mobile operator services, which could be formed into 
about 30 sub-groups. The sub-groups formed components of a super-group. Traffic figures 
were deduced from these using a statistical measure of the most commonly occurring bit rate.  
For application services the major super-groups were identified as being: 
• Communications and enabling services (i.e. used within other applications, or 
standalone, such as search, or navigation, or message generation). 
• Entertainment. 
• Lifestyle support including e-government services to citizens. 
• Business services, including m-commerce based trading and public sector services. 
• Operators’ business support services. 
Many of these services could be supplied to a fixed location – either to a mobile terminal such 
as a handset, or to a fixed transceiver in home or office, over a wireless local loop. In both 
cases, use of the radio spectrum is called for. 
Rise of new categories  
One major area for future services is between non-human communicants, i.e. communications 
and mobile services aimed at sensors, servers and robotic or automated machines to carry out 
some task, now sometimes referred to as the ‘Internet of things’ (ITU, 2005). It is especially 
driven by the use of RFID devices attached to mobile objects and their sensor networks. This 
has widespread application in health care (Srivastava, 2006) and elderly care as well as 
logistics and physical security. Wireless LANs in general are expanding in use and bandwidth 
also from slow rates for data monitoring to video speeds for surveillance. We are now in an 
initial phase of fairly simple goods tracking in logistics networks and retail. In a second 
phase, a far more complex radio infrastructure may be used, driving machine to machine 
communications both in the business sector (especially industrial process usage) and in the 
consumer segment (smart home/domestic devices and entertainment centres). 
Further areas for progress are extensions of existing mobile services with richer and more 
focused uses, often depending on the mobile Internet. These include location-enabled 
applications, dependent on location-based services (LBS) which use satellite geographic 
positioning systems (GPS), or some form of base-station triangulation. We now look at 
certain categories in more detail. 
2.2.2 Lifestyle services 
Concept 
Lifestyle support includes all those service whose advantage is in ubiquity (such as m-
commerce transaction consumer services) to support a richer lifestyle, especially for those 
who suffer from time poverty.  
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These services may well be used more by those balancing several worlds, of family, 
employment and organization of their personal life, and so may well appeal to women more 
than men in making everyday life more convenient and safer. The move towards lifestyle 
services using wireless communications such as m-commerce and m-banking will only 
become widely taken up services if secure wireless communications can provide a trusted 
transaction environment for the consumer. All such sophisticated services would benefit from 
EU-wide markets for both investment in the quality of the services and the potential volume 
of sales. 
Major services 
Major types of services in this category could include18: 
• Physical security and protection. 
• Lifestyle organization including identity and data security. 
• M-commerce and m-banking. 
• Personal financial and insurance services management. 
• Location enabled applications such as location and navigation. 
• Specialised needs for the disabled, with targeted lifestyle support services, including 
smart home (domotique) services – surveillance, commands and alerts for 
interworking for domestic appliances, entertainment centres and security centres. 
• Health for the citizen. 
• Education – distance learning and supports for education – may require broadband, 
possibly via mobile or fixed local loop. 
2.2.3 Business services 
Concept 
The business use of radio is not new, i.e. use of radio-based services to enhance business 
productivity, through mobility, and so create new business processes and whole new business 
models. Analysis by numerous researchers on the firm’s productivity with mobility has 
highlighted the major advances that can be made (Maliranta et al, 2006; Aral et al, 2006). The 
advantages of having common services with standard user interfaces EU-wide, identical 
costing, naming and addressing across all Member States will both aid users and make sales 
by suppliers easier. Pan-European access creates a far larger market for business models that 
might not work on a set of national scales varying from the very large to the tiny. 
Major services 
Major types of services in this category could include: 
• Business-specific communications and applications access, use of mobile access to 
databases and key applications, mobility based business processes, e.g. on site house 
survey reporting, remote insurance assessments, warehouse operations, etc. 
• Ubiquitous office functions – mobile email, mobile videoconferencing, etc. 
• Business transaction applications (with some form of customer interface). 
                                                 
18 For a detailed breakdown of the component services for each service type, see Appendix C to the FMS study 
report (Forge, 2005), at http://fms.jrc.es/pages/documents.htm 
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• Business infrastructure services including machine to machine and logistics. 
• Business training programmes. 
2.2.4 E-government, other public and emergency services 
Concept 
Most e-government services in place depend on a user interface with an Internet-connected 
PC. However, if such services are to become a standard part of every citizen’s life, then a 
more ubiquitous interface is required. With some 400 million mobile handsets in the EU 
today, the lesson of Japan – that the mobile Internet is the major mass platform for Internet 
access – indicates its ubiquitous appeal. Future applications of spectrum use could include 
many government interactions for citizens, from paying taxes to voting. They would benefit 
from having a common EU root design, especially for an intuitive human interface and 
templates for national variations (e.g. local tax systems). The concept depends on the 
services’ security levels and their perception, to gain the users’ confidence for transactions 
over two hazardous environments – the air interface and the Internet. It also needs MNOs to 
offer open Internet access, not just ‘walled gardens’ of their own mobile Internet products. 
Main types of services expected across the EU 
Major services in this category could include: 
• Voting with authentication, using some form of identity code with biometrics. 
• Tax and registration forms processing and follow-up. 
• Central government national and local government alerts. 
• Access to local government services for community services, policing, education, 
jobs, disabled support and social services, town planning, etc. 
• Calls for tender for publicly financed projects with all communications with bidders.  
2.3 The demand side 
2.3.1 Consumer demand for services, today and tomorrow 
The hierarchy of need 
To understand future uses of spectrum we should first examine real underlying needs by 
looking at the demand side, with a socio-economic approach19. Disposable income determines 
consumption – what is bought and how it is bought. Failure to understand the real utility to 
the user of a service, combined with affordability and accessibility, has led to too many errors 
in estimating demand for telecommunications services in the past. Too often, a technocentric 
view of new communications services has resulted in demand being vastly overestimated – or 
underestimated. Thus while some of the biggest product launches in communications services 
over the past 20 years have failed, seemingly trivial services have exploded. For instance, 
forecasts for the take-up of wireless access protocol (WAP) for mobile web access to rich data 
services were greatly overestimated. By contrast, the impact of a simple radio-based service, 
SMS, was greatly underestimated and was largely unforeseen by the industry.  
                                                 
19 Demand for services by a needs analysis is examined in detail in the final report and especially the Appendices 
in the Future Mobile Services study, available at: http://fms.jrc.es/pages/documents.htm 
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We should also note that in wireless services, a regional market such as the European Union 
will be increasingly shaped by a global market. In 2020, there could be of the order of five 
billion mobile users, shaping technology, services, content and pricing.    
In estimating consumer demand it may be useful to employ tools such as the hierarchy of 
need (originally due to Maslow) which implies the basics such as security come first in 
consumer demand, followed by lifestyle support for convenience of organization and 
entertainments last. This would indicate that entertainment services such as DTV come after 
more primary needs such as work and personal lifestyle organization, so that demand for such 
support services is likely to be high. This has been verified somewhat with the take-off of 
mobile generally, first as a business service, from 1995 in Europe. It has been also driven by 
pricing – the efforts made to ensure that it is widely affordable via pay as you go schemes, for 
example, that have made Italy and Portugal early leaders in penetration of mobile services – 
because disposable income limits were met. 
Changing needs, changing services 
What we see as necessary today was not even considered as part of our lives 20 years ago – 
our mental model of use of radio-based services dependent on spectrum has moved on 
considerably since then. For instance, consumers increasingly demand services that they can 
use when they travel wherever in the EU or overseas. Equally, the telecommunications 
industry would like and benefit from similar common rules of engagement and a level playing 
field for competition across the EU, while profiting from a larger market for each service. 
There is a demand for a more harmonized, liberal approach to spectrum management, which 
will enable the mobile industry to create those pan-European services that are in demand.  
2.3.2 Business demands, today and tomorrow 
The business use of radio 
Business and public services will expect to expand their use of the radio spectrum over the 
next twenty years. First there is an industrial explosion in needs for radio communications 
services in enabling technologies for novel business processes, be it in managing whole 
container ports to tracking patients inside a hospital and assuring correct treatment with links 
to the patient administration system, to replenishing supermarket stocks on shelves. 
Globalization of business will drive innovative uses of radio, being a major factor in 
mitigating some of its more difficult impacts. Migratory work, working across time zones and 
maintaining business continuity, with videoconferencing, messaging and document exchanges 
as well as access to key applications that may operate the business remotely (e.g. a customer 
or a production database) will be the main drivers. Access from home or the other side of the 
world will increasingly use some form of radio-based access, for nomadic or mobile working 
and increasingly there are pressures for this to be broadband access. 
Main trends in future usages 
More vertical applications may be expected while general usage across factory areas, offices, 
public areas such as meeting and conference centres usage expand with radio LANs. New 
ways of organizing work will be based on mobile working, especially as physical transport 
becomes more expensive both in environmental terms and in the cost of time consumed in 
travel such as commuting. 
Although metropolitan area radio and expansion in rural radio local loop broadband for e-
communications may be thought to be the major trend to overcome the digital divide, short 
range uses will also be important to form a connectivity infrastructure at close range (1–10 
metres especially for consumer ICTs) and may be an equally important growth area, to 
cellular-type ranges of networking. 
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Successors to WiMAX for broadband will only appear if the spectrum is available. This tends 
to imply unlicensed bands rather than licensed (e.g. as in the recent decision to allow WiMAX 
operations at 3G UMTS frequencies) as it takes so long to assign licensed bands. Moreover 
more flexibility in spectrum assignment is needed to launch new radio technologies. Only 
unlicensed bandwidth gives this freedom. This implies the model of ‘passive regulation’, of 
the device being enabled to use radio technology by the manufacturer, rather than an operator 
being licensed to allow users to connect. 
2.3.3 Converging business/ consumer demands in new lifestyles 
Concept 
A major premise now changing much of European society is more flexible working with 
mobile, nomadic and remote teleworking. Moreover we have growing communities that 
socialise over the Internet. The ideal of juggling several social and work worlds will come to 
even greater importance as the workforce becomes more equal in gender so that women move 
higher up the scale of management in all industries and require the communication tools to 
support family and working lives. Thus social forces will drive a melding of business and 
lifestyles. Radio is an essential tool in this social development. 
Converged services and their implications 
Converging work, social functions and entertainment into one environment, and perhaps one 
device could enables access to any service from anywhere. This does require reasonable 
bandwidth, to accommodate Internet access and is more than is currently available. Either a 
re-apportioning of bandwidth or the use of new sharing technologies may become far more 
necessary in a future Europe. The chosen spectrum should also offer good penetration of 
buildings. This makes spectrum refarmed from the digital dividend ideal, in the frequency 
ranges from 800 MHz down to 500 MHz or lower. Their propagation range is also especially 
attractive for a low cost infrastructure.  
2.3.4 Overall spectrum demands, for current and future services 
The main mobile application-level services outlined above have different spectrum 
demands.20 Some of these applications are quite different to conventional cellular mobile 
communications, e.g. sensor networks for the Internet of Things and short-range devices 
including near-field communications with a range of under a metre. 
To these future mobile services must be added other current users – broadcast, military, civil 
aviation, civil emergency communications, marine uses, etc – but perhaps in new forms. Such 
advances include the digital broadcast services for TV and radio, DAB and DTV as well as 
digital satellite services for broadcast TV. Delivery channels for mobile other than terrestrial 
are also here – specifically mobile satellite services, probably using low earth orbit satellites 
(LEOs). Spectrum bandwidth requirements for uses other than TV and mobile – military, etc 
– may take up to half of the total in certain prime regions of the spectrum, e.g. from 200 kHz 
to 1 Ghz. Reducing their generous allocations and moving them to newer (digital) 
technologies (e.g. for radars, navigation beacons and radio direction finding) may reduce their 
bandwidth needs to perhaps 30% of the prime spectrum regions. 
                                                 
20 See Appendix C to main FMS for definitions, technical attributes such as bit rates and type of communications 
(e.g. voice, video, data file etc): http://fms.jrc.es/pages/documents.htm. 
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2.3.5 Spectrum bandwidth requirements for current and future services 
Analysis of requirements by future service type for bit rate (and so bandwidth) is shown in 
Table 9. The relation between bit rate and bandwidth depend upon the coding type, which 
may be between 5 bits per Hz, and for the latest technology, over 25 bits per Hz, so that the 
bandwidth required in Hz is the bit rate divided by that factor. However, as the air interface is 
unreliable and may require resends, and data packets may have high overheads, net 
throughput will be lower.  
Table 9: Future services demands for spectrum in terms of ITU bit rate classes 
Service class Total  <16 
kbps 
<128 
kbps 
<384 
kbps 
<2 
Mbps 
<10 
Mbps 
<30 
Mbps 
<100 
Mbps 
Un-
specified
Communications 
and enabling 
services 
17 3 3 5 5 1 0 0 0 
Entertainment 31 1 2 14 9 5 0 0 0 
Lifestyle support 
excluding e-
Government  
44 1 15 10 16 2    
e-Government 9  1  7 1 0 0 0 
Business 
services, 
including m-
Commerce  
27 1 7 3 14 2 0 0 0 
Operators’ 
business support 
services 
4 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Forge (2005), Appendix C, http://fms.jrc.es/pages/documents.htm. 
Most future mobile services will need a link with a bit rate that is less than 10 Mbps, good 
news for operators fearful of multiple users demanding enormous bandwidth all at once. The 
impacts of future compression algorithms should also be considered, especially for rich media 
(e.g. those in the MPEG series) which may even reduce the required bit rates and spectrum 
demands further.  
This implies that mobile broadband for future common services across the EU is viable, with 
cost efficiency, if a swathe of common bandwidth is made available, be it a commons or in 
licensed bands across all Member States. With no sharing of spectrum, as in a licensed model, 
these bit rates would imply at least 10 to 20 MHz per mobile operator or radio local loop 
operator to supply broadband to multiple users. With shared spectrum using new 
technologies, this could be an unlicensed band. Here, providing mobile Internet over a 
broadband bearer will become a prominent demand and the ideas of spectrum usage for IP 
services at low cost, currently entertained for WiFi and perhaps WiMAX, should be 
considered more generally. 
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3. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS AND REGULATORY LIMITS  
3.1 Introduction 
The achievement of a more coherent spectrum policy in the EU crucially depends on whether 
proposed new measures at community level would be hampered by legal constraints exerted 
by legislation and commitments at the international, regional and national level. In this 
chapter we illustrate the features of the existing EU framework and its existing rules at all 
these different levels. Section 3.2 surveys the current status of EU legislation, by describing 
the main objectives of EU spectrum policy, the complex architecture of decision making and 
the most recent initiatives undertaken by the European Commission in this field. Section 3.3 
summarises the existing constraints in flexibility and technology/service neutrality as 
provided by international agreements, including the GE-06 agreement and the Maastricht 
Special Arrangement (MA02). Section 3.4 contains a brief description of the legal framework 
and potential obstacles to spectrum reform in EU member states, and focuses on four national 
experiences, i.e. Italy, Romania, Sweden and the UK. Section 3.5 provides some concluding 
remarks. 
3.2 Current state of the legal framework 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Until the end of the 1990s, spectrum rules were mostly defined at national level, with member 
states coordinating their spectrum policies in international fora such as ITU and CEPT. The 
development of a coherent spectrum policy had not been a policy priority at EU level until 
1998, when the Commission adopted the Green Paper on radio spectrum21. However, already 
in the late 1980s initiatives had been adopted to harmonise some frequency bands, including: 
(i) the 1987 GSM Directive, which reserved the 905-914 and 950-959 MHz frequency bands 
for a public pan-European cellular digital mobile communications service starting from 1 
January 1991, and paved the way towards the extension of this service to the whole 890-915 
and 935-960 MHz bands22; (ii) the ERMES Directive in 1990, which required Member States 
to designate in the 169.4-169.8 MHz radio spectrum band four channels for the pan-European 
land-based public radio paging service; (iii) the DECT Directive, which required Member 
States to designate the frequency band 1880-1900 MHz for digital European cordless 
telecommunications by 1 January 199223; (iv) the Resolutions adopted by the Council and the 
European Parliament on Satellite Personal Communication Systems (S-PCS) in 1993 and 
199524; and (v) measures undertaken to ensure the coordinated introduction of a third-
generation mobile and wireless communications system (UMTS) in the Community, which 
secured the availability of sufficient spectrum as allocated by the ERC to the frequency bands 
1900-1980 MHz, 2010-2025 MHz and 2110-2170 MHz25. 
                                                 
21 COM(1999)596. 
22 Article 1. 
23 (Council Directive 91/287/EEC of 3 June 1991). 
24 The EP in its Resolution of 19 May 1995 on mobile and personal communications considered it a priority 
objective to establish a harmonized licensing approach for satellite-based mobile and personal communications 
and, on that basis, to initiate procedures for licensing such systems at an early stage; whereas, according to that 
Resolution, that approach should have been implemented by 1 January 1996 in order to take account of the rapid 
development of such services at global level and of their potential in both social and commercial terms. 
25 On 30 June 1997 the ERC adopted Decision ERC/DEC/(97)07 on the frequency bands for the introduction of 
UMTS which entered into force on 1 October 1997. 
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In addition, Commission Directive 96/2/EC extended the application of Directive 90/388/EEC 
to mobile and personal communication services, thus opening them to competition between 
industry players26. Some of these initiatives were successful (e.g. GSM and DECT); others 
were not (ERMES). 
After the 1998 Green Paper on spectrum, the first step adopted at EU level was the 
harmonization of technical requirements to telecommunications equipment, achieved with the 
R&TTE (Radio and Telecommunications Terminal Equipment) Directive in 199927. The 
Directive defines the essential requirements that products must meet (including the obligation 
to avoid interference) and the procedures manufacturers must apply to place products on the 
market, in line with Directive 98/34 and thus through a conformity assessment procedure and 
CE marking. The R&TTE Directive includes some elements of flexibility by: (i) establishing 
a co-regulation mechanism which gives market players the possibility to influence 
harmonized standards, thus taking account of new technological developments; and (ii) 
allowing products to be placed on the market where harmonized standards are absent, or using 
technologies other than those contained in harmonized standards, provided that the essential 
requirements – including non-interference – are met. 
After the R&TTE Directive and the ‘1999 Review’28, the 2002 New Regulatory Framework 
(NRF) for electronic communications networks and services created a regulatory framework 
that enabled the development of a more coherent radio spectrum policy for the European 
Community:  
• Articles 8 and 9 of the Framework Directive laid down principles for the use and 
management of radio frequencies for electronic communications services, and refer to 
the promotion of ‘efficient use’, harmonization and effective management of radio 
frequencies with allocation and assignment, based on objective, transparent, non-
discriminatory and proportionate criteria. Article 9 states that member states may make 
provisions for undertakings to transfer rights to use radio frequencies, and ensure that 
the authority responsible for spectrum assignment is notified of planned transfers. NRAs 
shall also ensure that competition is not distorted as a result of any such transaction. 
• The Authorization Directive specifies the essential requirement of avoiding harmful 
interference: such requirement may justify an exception to the general rule that spectrum 
use should be only to conditions included in general authorizations to provide services 
or networks, not to individual licences. The Directive also imposes obligations upon 
member states on the rights of use for radio frequencies and conditions which may be 
attached to such rights; it defines the procedures for limiting the number of rights of use 
to be granted for radio frequencies, and regulates the imposition of fees for these rights. 
• The EU Radio Spectrum Decision shapes the current architecture of decision making by 
establishing a cooperation mechanism (Art. 4) which allows the EC to issue mandates to 
CEPT on the harmonization of frequency use and to make the resulting ECC Decisions 
mandatory for all EU member states29. 
                                                 
26 Directive 90/388/EEC provided for the abolition of special or exclusive rights granted by Member States in 
respect of the provision of telecommunications services, but originally did not apply to mobile services. 
Directive 96/2/EC was preceded by a Green Paper on Mobile and Personal Communications (COM(94)145 
final). 
27 Directive 1999/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 1999 on radio equipment and 
telecommunications terminal equipment and the mutual recognition of their conformity (OJ L 91 , 07.04.1999, 
pp. 10-28). 
28 COM(2000)239. 
29 Decision on “A regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the European Community” (2002/676/EC). 
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In order to secure efficient spectrum use, the Radio Spectrum Decision provides for the 
publication, in appropriate databases, of national radio frequency allocation tables and 
updated information on rights, conditions, procedures, charges and fees concerning the 
use of radio spectrum. 
3.2.2 Objectives of EU spectrum policy 
The EU spectrum policy pursues three main overarching goals:  
• to support specific policy objectives by ensuring the timely availability of sufficient 
harmonized spectrum in the EU; 
• to contribute to growth, competitiveness, employment and inclusion; 
• to pursue EU-level coordination and thus help achieving the internal market for e-
communications. 
A study conducted in 2004 estimated that even if Member States individually took the most 
appropriate action to modernise their spectrum management, the effect would be that Europe 
would fail to realise 30% of the potential benefits unless the EU coordinated its efforts. This 
also contributes to the representation of EU interests in international negotiations, in relation 
to existing policies, in key sectors such as electronic communications, transport, R&D or 
broadcasting (Analysys et al, 2004). 
These overarching goals, in turn, are pursued by ensuring an efficient use of spectrum 
resources throughout the EU, as prescribe by the Framework Directive. This intermediate goal 
is currently approached through the introduction of more flexibility in the management of 
spectrum resources for wireless electronic communications, while maintaining harmonization 
where necessary. As a result, the way towards optimal use of spectrum resources in the EU 
passes through a careful balancing of flexibility and harmonization (see section 1.4).  
3.2.3 The architecture of decision making 
The current architecture of decision making at EU level entails the interaction of many 
different players, with different competencies. In particular: 
• Policy measures are mostly adopted by the Commission through consultation with the 
Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG), set up in 2002 and consisting of high level 
experts from national administrations as well as a diverse set of observers. The RSPG 
has developed, inter alia, the Wireless Access Policy for Electronic Communication 
Services (WAPECS) concept since 2004, and is advising the Commission in key areas 
such as the deployment of multimedia services and the future use of the digital dividend. 
• Technical implementation measures are dealt with through the Radio Spectrum 
Committee (RSC), composed of representatives of the Member States and linked with 
national authorities responsible for spectrum management. The RSC supported the 
Commission on specific initiatives regarding, inter alia, automotive radars and assisted 
hearing devices, 2 GHz mobile satellite systems, the harmonized availability of 
information regarding spectrum use, the proposed harmonization of the use of the 900 
and 1800 MHz bands (enabling 3G and other services to be used in the GSM bands) and 
the Decision on Mobile Communication aboard Aircraft. These measures are interlinked 
with equipment regulations under the R&TTE Directive. 
• A third forum for cooperation – dealing with the harmonization of frequency 
allocation, the availability of information and other technical implementing measures – 
is the issuing of mandates by the Commission (via the RSC) to the European 
Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), which consists 
of representatives of 48 national administrations. 
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The procedure is outlined both in the Radio Spectrum Decision (Art. 4 §3) and in the 
Commission-CEPT Memorandum of Understanding signed in January 2004. 
Figure 6: The architecture of decision-making 
 
3.2.4 The evolution of legislation 
After the entry into force of the NRF, EU institutions have gradually realised the need for 
enhanced flexibility, technology and service neutrality, trading and – where possible, 
unlicensed or collective use. A key step in this respect was the development by the RSPG of 
the WAPECS concept (RSPG, 2005). The Commission subsequently announced its intention 
to integrate these principles in the NRF, strengthen the EU dimension in licensing, and clarify 
technology and service neutrality principles as applied to spectrum. In the 2005 
Communication, the Commission proposed to: (i) introduce spectrum markets in the EU by 
2010; (ii) reap the full benefits of the switchover from analogue to digital terrestrial 
broadcasting by setting a target date at 2012; (iii) develop a common spectrum approach for 
all wireless platforms providing e-communications services without artificially differentiating 
between technologies30. 
These goals were further elaborated in the 2007 Communication31.  Actions proposed include 
the following: 
• the identification of spectrum bands used by the broadcasting, mobile and information 
technology (IT) sectors in which current legal restrictions should be re-examined with a 
view to permitting more flexible usage, starting from a number of designated bands for a 
total of 1350 MHz. The bands selected were: 
                                                 
30 A forward-looking radio spectrum policy for the European Union: Second annual report, COM(2005)411 
final, 6 September 2005. In response to this proposal, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution, recognising 
the desirability of more unlicensed spectrum as one of three spectrum management paradigms (unlicensed, 
spectrum markets and “command and control”). 2006/2212(INI), 14 February 2007. 
31 Rapid access to spectrum for wireless electronic communications services through more flexibility, 
(COM(2007)50). 
 
IP/A/ITRE/ST/2007-04
 
                        Page 37 of 69
 
                           PE 393.521
o the UHF (470-862 MHz) band (currently used for broadcasting, but potentially usable 
also for mobile multimedia services and for extending the reach of all types of wireless 
electronic communication services into rural areas);  
o the 880-915 MHz/925-960 MHz and 1710-1785 MHz/1805-1880 MHz bands (currently 
used for GSM mobile services, but potentially upgradeable to UMTS and other 
technologies);  
o the 1900-1980 MHz/2010-2025 MHz/2110-2170 MHz bands (currently used for IMT-
2000/UMTS, but potentially open to broadcasters);  
o the 2.6 GHz band (still to be licensed and available from 2008, and intended for use by 
IMT-2000/UMTS or alternative broadband technologies such as WiMAX); and,  
o the 3.4-3.8 GHz band (currently used for broadband connections to the customer’s 
premises, and for satellite communications within Russia and a number of African 
countries).  
• the review of the validity of the GSM Directive and the application of  the new approach 
to the ‘digital dividend’32. 
• the attribution of more power and responsibility to industry players in selecting the most 
effective and efficient way to use their spectrum rights in a way that avoids harmful 
interference.  
Other initiatives on harmonization of bands include Commission Decisions on: (i) bands to be 
allocated to Radio frequency Identification (RFID); (ii) use of the radio spectrum for 
equipment using ultra-wideband technology; (iii) availability as from 1 July 2007 of the 
frequency bands 1980-2010 MHz and 2170-2200 MHz for systems providing mobile satellite 
services; (iv) harmonization of the 79 GHz band for the use of automotive short-range radar 
equipment; (v) the harmonization of the 24 GHz band for the time-limited use by automotive 
short-range radar equipment; (vi) harmonized use of the 5 GHz frequency band for the 
implementation of wireless access systems including radio local area networks 
(WAS/RLANs); and (vii) harmonization of the 169.4-169.8125 MHz frequency band in the 
Community. 
Most recently, on 13 November 2007, the Commission issued a Communication on the digital 
dividend33, which forms part of the broader revision of the NRF. The Commission announces 
the use of a binding Community law instrument to establish ‘application clusters’ in common 
spectrum bands in the UHF band. It would constitute a ‘top-level’ spectrum organization upon 
which national and EU-wide plans can be developed, defining the bounds within which 
national flexibility can be exercised by allowing for different levels of EU harmonization for 
each cluster. Concretely, the clustering should be based on three sub-bands for the three most 
common types of networks: (i) Unidirectional high power networks (i.e. mainly for fixed 
broadcasting services) to be managed at national level to ensure the continuation of existing 
TV programmes in digital format and to accommodate new broadcasting needs; (ii) 
Unidirectional medium to low power networks (i.e. typically for mobile multimedia services, 
and newer forms of converged broadcasting and communications services), also to be dealt 
with both at national level and with optional EU harmonization measures; and (iii) Bi-
directional low power networks (i.e. typically for fixed and mobile broadband access 
services), which could also possibly include other applications such as innovative low-power 
broadcasting services. Figure 7 illustrates the Commission’s proposed sub-bands. 
                                                 
32 This measure was already translated into a Commission proposed Directive, COM(2007) 367 final. 
33 Reaping the full benefits of the digital dividend in Europe: A common approach to the use of the spectrum 
released by the digital switchover. 
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Figure 7: Proposed clustering of spectrum. 
 
 
Source: European Commission, Communication “Reaping the full benefits of the digital dividend in Europe” 
(2007). 
In addition, Article 1 of the proposed Directive amending the NRF introduces technology and 
service neutrality as binding principles (articles 9.3 and 9.4) with the possibility for 
exceptions to the principle in limited cases such as meeting general interest objectives. The 
proposed Directive enhances the importance of spectrum tradability, which can be imposed in 
commonly defined bands (Article 9b); introduces a transitional phase (Article 9a) and allows 
the Commission to take implementing measures via the comitology procedure to coordinate 
the application of the new principles (9c) for internal market purposes. Articles 5, 6 and 7 of 
the proposed Directive calls member states to take measures to stop spectrum hoarding 
(Article 5(6)); and provides the Commission with strong powers to facilitate access to 
spectrum for firms needing rights of use in all Member States by coordinating or harmonizing 
the conditions applicable to individual rights, the selection procedures and the selection of the 
undertakings, with assistance from the new European Electronic Communications Market 
Authority34. 
3.3 Impact on international agreements 
The initiatives described in the previous sections represent important steps towards the 
development of a coherent EU spectrum policy. However, the feasibility of implementing 
these measures essentially depends on the legal constraints existing at international level 
(ITU, CEPT), and at national level. For this reason, the next section briefly addresses the 
compatibility of new proposed measures with existing international commitments and 
agreements. Section 3.4 analyses the constraints existing at Member State level. 
                                                 
34 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of (…) 2007 amending Directives 
2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and services, and 
2002/20/EC on the authorization of electronic communications networks and services. 
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3.3.1 ITU and CEPT levels 
The coordination of spectrum at a global level is the responsibility of the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), a United Nations agency with the mission to maintain and 
extend international cooperation for the improvement and rational use of telecommunications. 
Every three to four years, the ITU-R holds a World Administrative Radiocommunication 
Conference (WARC, now abbreviated to WRC), a process aimed at adapting the ITU Radio 
Regulations (RR), the international treaty coordinating spectrum usage globally. At WRCs, 
frequencies are first allocated to services (referred to as allocations); subsequently, individual 
countries allot frequencies to specific areas or regions (referred to as allotments) and assign 
them through licences to stations (in a process called assignment). The allocation of each band 
within the regions may be to one or more services within one of the two categories: primary 
services or secondary services. This is important in light of the current Commission 
proposals: suffice it to say that if a secondary service suffers unacceptable interference from a 
primary service, it cannot claim protection. Below, we examine the main legal constraints 
exerted by existing ITU regulations and CEPT agreements on the proposed new Commission 
measures aimed at developing a common EU spectrum policy. 
Bands III, IV and V 
The potential impact of the currently proposed EU measures would be felt mostly in 
frequency bands 174-230 MHz and 470-862 MHz, the use of which has been planned by the 
Geneva 2006 (GE-06) Agreement. The GE-06 Agreement established a plan containing 
frequency allotments and assignments for the transmission of DVB-T and T-DAB services in 
these two bands (‘the Plan’). The GE-06 Agreement leaves significant flexibility in 
implementing the Plan: the concept of allotment planning provides a high degree of flexibility 
regarding the location of broadcasting transmitters within the corresponding service area and 
interference envelope of the entry in the Plan; whereas the concepts of interference envelope 
and spectrum mask offer flexibility for implementing broadcasting services with different 
characteristics or other applications. If the proposed use exceeds the limits set for the 
envelope, it requires prior agreement from affected administrations.  
As far as these two bands are concerned, the GE-06 seems to allow, in principle, for greater 
flexibility. However, limitations exist, some of which have already been pointed out in the 
RSPG opinion on multimedia services, and may constrain the use of the digital dividend: 
• The use of bands 174-230 MHz and 470-862 MHz is primarily allocated to broadcasting 
services, and will continue to be constrained until protection of analogue transmissions 
has ceased, which is generally expected in 2012, but sooner in some countries in the EU; 
• In most CEPT countries, very few allocations for other primary terrestrial services are 
found in bands III, IV and V. This means that the envelope concept is not feasible for 
CEPT administrations at present. However, this situation might change as a result of 
WRC-07 or in the WRC-11, where new allocations for mobile services in bands III, IV 
and V could be decided. 
• In many countries, the implementation of mobile multimedia services may thus require 
departing from the reference planning configuration (RPC) adopted at GE-06, and hence 
entail delays and network costs. The limitations of the envelope concept are seen by 
many countries as too restrictive, and to overcome this restriction, 52 administrations, 
mainly from CEPT countries, have added a declaration (Declaration No. 42) to the GE-
06 Agreement stating that they intend to use the envelope concept for other terrestrial 
applications (not primarily broadcasting), which in principle would allow for 
negotiations of the broadcast spectrum by commercial telecommunication operators. 
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• The flexibility left to administrations for developing the Plan has already led to 
significant variations in the entries, hence in the ability of harmonizing usage in the 
future. 
• There remain serious technical concerns regarding the practical aspects of co-existence 
on the same territory of two very different types of transmission networks, namely (i) 
the traditional broadcasting network, based on high-power transmission sites, and (ii) 
the dense low-power network, more suitable for implementation of mobile multimedia 
services, which require higher levels of field strength for reliable indoor reception. 
• Another potential source of interference to the traditional broadcasting network could be 
the uplink transmissions of the other terrestrial services in cases where these are 
distributed by satellite. If the spectrum for the uplink communication is allocated within 
the broadcast frequency bands then the interference to the domestic television receivers 
is likely to be unacceptably high. 
• Finally, based on the GE-06 Plan, many licences for digital broadcasting or multimedia 
broadcasting services have already been granted in European countries for the next 10-
15 years. This suggests that, absent new measures at EU level, the Europe-wide 
harmonization and implementation of a sub-band for multimedia broadcasting services 
would not be realistic before 2020.  
L-Band 
An alternative to the immediate search for the digital dividend in the broadcast spectrum 
consists in exploring the potential of the L-Band, 1452-1492 MHz. At ITU level, the 
regulatory status of this band is rooted in the ITU WARC-02, which allocates the L-band 
globally on a primary basis for use by the Broadcasting Satellite Service for the purposes of 
digital audio broadcasting via satellite. At CEPT level, the Maastricht 2002 Special 
Arrangement (MA-02) provided for an allotment plan for T-DAB services in the sub-band 
1452-1479.5 MHz35. In addition, based on the CEPT Decision ECC (03)02, the band 1479.5-
1492 MHz is designated exclusively for S-DAB systems. 
The MA-02 foresaw the implementation of T-DAB only. Since new, non-primarily allocated 
services such as T-DMB and DAB-IP use the same bandwidth and have similar technical 
characteristics as T-DAB, they can already be accommodated in accordance with MA-02 
without having to change the rules. In contrast, other systems required a wider bandwidth (up 
to 8 MHz). There has been growing consensus in Europe that MA-02 should be amended in 
order to allow for more flexibility. In particular, the RSC has issued a mandate to the CEPT 
on EU harmonization of the 1452-1479.5 MHz band to allow flexible use by mobile 
multimedia technologies, requesting CEPT to make an assessment of the technical and 
regulatory conditions and to issue recommendations. CEPT proposed: (i) the introduction in 
the MA-02 of an interference envelope concept similar to that in the GE-06; and (ii) a 
possibility to aggregate T-DAB blocks in order to enable the operation of systems requiring a 
larger bandwidth. The MA-02 Special Arrangement has been finally modified on 4th July 
2007 at Constantza, Romania, so as to allow greater flexibility in the use of the band. A draft 
‘Commission Decision on the harmonization of the band 1452-1479.5 MHz to allow flexible 
use by mobile multimedia technologies in the European Community’ was prepared by the 
RSC in October 2007. 
                                                 
35 ‘Special Arrangement of the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations 
(CEPT) relating to the use of the 1452–1479.5 MHz band for Terrestrial Digital Audio Broadcasting (T-DAB)’, 
(Special Arrangement Maastricht 2002 or MA-02), entered into force on 01 September 2002. 
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The 2.5 GHz band 
This band is allocated at ITU level to IMT-2000 services (UMTS), but the question is open to 
whether the relevant bands should be made available for IMT-2000 exclusively or for new 
technologies besides or beyond IMT-2000 as well. The majority of Member States have 
recently stated that the band should be harmonized for IMT-2000 with no deviation at this 
stage, subject to further review at a subsequent stage. The main problem emerging in the 
(re)allocation of these bands to UMTS and other services is to be found at national level, as in 
many Member States this band is still subject to exclusive use for defence or other 
governmental uses. 
Bands suitable for Broadband Wireless Access (BWA) services 
In other bands selected by the European Commission for the introduction of more flexible and 
technology-neutral arrangements, there are no significant constraints exerted by ITU 
regulations. For the 3400-3600 MHz band, considered as the most suitable for future 
sustainable BWA deployment in CEPT countries, existing arrangements in some Member 
States already exhibit features that favour the development of the BWA market (spectrum 
assigned in blocks of sufficient size; no registration of user terminals needed; very basic 
access requirements, rare restrictions on technology or services). Also the 3600-3800 MHz 
band and the 5725-5875 MHz bands do not feature significant obstacles at international level. 
At CEPT level, the latter band is subject to analysis, mostly as regards technological issues 
such as sharing between BFWA and other services (e.g. protection of frequency hopping 
radars). 
3.3.2 WRC-07: EU position and outcomes 
As the most important international constraints lie in the UHF band and in the ‘UMTS 
extension’ band, the European Commission carried out an extensive consultation on the 
proposals to be put on the WRC-07 table during November 2007. As a result, the Commission 
proposed to focus on identifying those frequency bands which can promote a convergent 
telecommunications environment in the long term. 
• ‘Co-primary status’ in the UHF Band. The Commission proposed to achieve more 
flexibility by upgrading the status of mobile multimedia services in the UHF band to the 
same status as broadcasting services (so-called “co-primary” allocation). 
• Interference in the 2.5–2.69 GHz (UMTS extension) band. The Commission proposed to 
devote every effort to minimize the risks of interference to IMT-2000 networks 
operating in the EU in the UMTS extension band from satellite services. 
• Technical sharing solutions in the C-band (3.4-4.2 GHz). The C-band is currently used 
as a backbone broadband network by satellite services, notably in developing countries. 
The Commission thus proposed to identify technical sharing solutions accommodating 
mobile requirements: this implied a prioritization of sub-bands for satellite and 
terrestrial services within the C-band, which would give both of them adequate long-
term guarantees of operating within this frequency band without undue interference. 
The EU was successful in meeting most of these aims. The key outcome of WRC-07 was the 
identification of bands for 3G and 4G mobile service, now collectively referred to as 
International Telecommunications Services (IMT). Two global IMT allocations were agreed: 
450-470 MHz, currently used for broadcasting and land mobile services; and 2.3-2.4 GHz, 
currently used for satellite and wireless broadband. In addition, the Region 1 (countries 
including Europe) agreed to harmonized spectrum use for IMT in the 790-862 MHz and 3.4-
3.6 GHz bands. 
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3.4 Overview of Member States’ licensing regimes 
In this section, we briefly illustrate the existing conditions for spectrum reform in four 
Member States – Italy, Romania, Sweden and UK – chosen with the aim of highlighting the 
range of approaches across the Member States and the differences that have resulted. 
3.4.1 Italy 
In Italy, competence for spectrum allocation is shared by the Communications Authority 
(Agcom) and the Ministry of Communications. Spectrum assignment in Italy has traditionally 
relied on the command-and-control method; licences in key bands have been assigned through 
administrative decisions, with the exception of the 3G auction and the upcoming WiMAX 
auction. Italy can be considered as a highly peculiar country in Western Europe as regards 
spectrum policy: a so-called ‘battle of frequencies’ some thirty years ago led broadcasters into 
a race to occupy frequencies on a ‘first come, first served’ basis – a situation which was 
termed ‘Wild West’ by some commentators. Reportedly, national regulators still struggle to 
get a clear picture of actual assignment of broadcasting frequencies today (Piacentino et al, 
2007). Italy today features a high concentration of frequencies in the hands of Rai 
Radiotelevisione and Reti Televisive Italiane (Mediaset Group) – which hold about 80% of 
total frequencies currently available for analogue TV broadcasting nationwide36. This problem 
was not solved by the advent of digital terrestrial TV services; Law no 66 of 2001 set the 
switch-off date at December 2006, then delayed to 2008 and recently to 2012. Law no 66 
allowed for broadcast spectrum trading to allow tests of digital switchover, but deplorably 
restricted the purchase of frequencies to broadcasters who already had an authorization to 
provide the same type of service, thereby blocking entry for new competitors. 
As a result, the Italian regulator acknowledges that the prospects for real spectrum 
liberalization in Italy leave little room for hope37 – the market is de facto and de jure closed to 
players that do not already operate as franchisors of broadcasting services. 
As regards the possible future allocation of bands in given frequencies, the following 
information describes the existing constraints and opportunity in Italy: 
• UHF band. The analogue switch-off is likely to free up approximately 100 MHz 
(probably in the upper UHF band), which will be released gradually. The digital 
dividend is likely to be initially available through non-adjacent sub-bands, and on a non-
interfering basis. Thus, services such as DAB/DMB or DVB-H (for radio uses), Mobile 
TV or HDTV seem favoured over UMTS, HSDPA/HSUPA) and WiMAX. 
• On July 13, 2007, the Ministry of Communications freed up the frequencies in the 865-
868 MHz band – partly used for military applications – for primary use by RFID 
devices, following Commission decision 2006/804/EC. 
• 900 MHz band. These bands are currently used for GSM services, but may be subject to 
refarming to accommodate 3G services. At the end of 2005, 5 MHz of prime spectrum 
in the 900 MHz band became available following switch-off of Tacs mobile phones. 
There is a growing interest for reallocating spectrum in the 900 MHz band to 
accommodate UMTS services: in particular, Agcom recently proposed to refarm the 900 
MHz band, and proposed two options: (i) short-term partial re-farming to allow for use 
of the band also by 3G system, after a transitional period; 
                                                 
36 AGCOM – Analisi del mercato dei servizi di diffusione radiotelevisiva per la trasmissione di contenuti agli 
utenti finali, sulla valutazione di sussistenza del significativo potere di mercato per le imprese ivi operanti, 
Annex B, Decision no. 61/2006/CONS, Feb. 1, in http://www.agcom.it. 
37 Ibid.  
 
IP/A/ITRE/ST/2007-04
 
                        Page 43 of 69
 
                           PE 393.521
(ii) longer-term total refarming, when the existing GSM licences will expire (between 
2015 and 2018). The Agcom has clearly expressed its preference for the former solution, 
which would be implemented by making available two blocks of 5 Mhz of spectrum, 
with an overall spectrum cap per operator of 25 MHz. The two options are currently 
under consultation following the Delibera Agcom n. 343 of 28 June 2007. 
Accommodating 3G services in the 900MHz band could facilitate the allocation of (part 
of) the 2.5 GHz band to WiMAX. 
• The L-Band and adjacent bands could be freed up for a total of 100 MHz (1.429 – 1.530 
MHz). This band was licensed for T-DAB applications following the MA-02 special 
arrangement, but these services are not yet operational in Italy. Adjacent bands are 
currently allocated to the Ministries of Communication and Defence (1.429-1.452 MHz 
and 1.492-1.530 MHz) for radio communications. 
• 1800 MHz band. This band is also allocated to GSM. A block of 2x20 MHz is currently 
unused and could be soon assigned to a new entrant. In June 2007, Agcom has also 
proposed refarming in this band: the proposal is currently subject to consultation. 
• In the 2.1 GHz band (so-called UMTS ‘core band’), spectrum was initially allocated to 
UMTS through an auction, which ended up being extremely burdensome for operators, 
generating more than €12 billion in revenues. In 2000, the duration of licences was 
extended from 15 to 20 years. Currently, 10 MHz in the 2010-2020 MHz band are 
unused. A 5 MHz portion of spectrum was recently claimed back from the consortium 
Ipse2000, which had not made any use of it after the award. 
• The 2.5-2.69 GHz band is currently used by the Ministry of Defence, although in 
principle it should be assigned to IMT-2000/UMTS technologies, and could be used also 
for WiMAX is the latter enters the family of IMT-2000 technologies. This band, once 
free, has to be assigned through a licence, and is strongly demanded by mobile operators 
for MBMS or 3G services. 
• The 2.7-2.9 GHz band (internationally indicated for WiMAX services) is currently used 
for air navigation and meteo services, and highly congested. For this reason, it seems 
unlikely that WiMAX could be accommodated in that band in Italy in the future. 
• As regards the 3.4-3.6 GHz band, the relevant spectrum was used by the Ministry of 
Defence until the end of December 2006, when the Ministry of Communications and the 
Ministry of Defence finally agreed on a plan whereby 2x75 MHz would be available for 
WiMAX in the 3.4-3.6 GHz band from June 200738. The auction was launched in 
October 2007. The Ministry of Communications launched an auction, which will assign 
3 blocks of at least 2x21 MHz (paired) for each geographic area (whereby one usage 
right is reserved for new entrants). Licences will last for 15 years, can be renewed for 10 
years and will not be transferable to a third party without government authorization. The 
expected revenue for the Italian government is estimated in the range between €100-200 
million. 
• As regards higher bands, the ‘Stanca decree’ liberalized usage of the 5 GHz band in 
2005 for the point-to-point connections based on the ETSI-HiperLan technology. In 
addition, the 2005 ‘Landolfi decree’ eliminated all territorial restrictions for the 
installation of WiFi access points in the 2GHz and in the 5.47-5.75 GHz bands, at the 
same time opening the 5.15-5.35 GHz band for indoor applications. 
                                                 
38 The two ministries also agreed that twice as many frequencies will be allocated to enable a nationwide spread 
of broadband services within five years. 
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These decrees led many local administrations to deploy wireless networks to bridge the 
digital divide. However, use of WiMAX in the 5.7 GHz band (125 MHz are available) 
would not be the best choice for WiMAX applications, as the band is extremely 
congested and does not allow for indoor reception. 
In summary, the Italian situation portraits a mixed picture, especially as regards the existing 
constraints relevant for the implementation of current Commission proposals. On the one 
hand, refarming proposals may lead to entry of at least one new player and the conversion of 
2G into 3G technology in the 900 MHz and 1800MHz bands, and the WiMAX auction could 
lead to increased availability of spectrum for broadband wireless access in the 3.4-3.8 GHz 
band rather soon. However, significant delays and competition problems exist in the UHF 
bands, which jeopardise Italy’s potential to reap the benefits of the digital dividend. At the 
same time, significant constraints exist in the L-band and in the 2.5 GHz band. The need to 
preserve legacy rights in UHF bands and 3G licences (on which operators invested enormous 
resources) may significantly affect the government’s agenda. 
3.4.2 Romania 
In Romania, the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MCTI) establishes 
the policies and strategies for the efficient usage of frequency spectrum and issues the 
National Frequency Allocation Table. The National Authority in Communication and 
Information Technology (ANRCTI) is responsible for the management, allocation and 
assignment of the radio spectrum for non-governmental usage. 
In April 2007, ANRCTI took over the rights and obligations of the former institution 
responsible for spectrum management, namely the General Inspectorate for Communications 
and Information Technology (IGCTI) which was dissolved. The EU policy regarding radio 
spectrum was transposed even before accession, through Emergency Ordinance no 79/2002. 
Romania is currently in the process of defining and introducing a set of flexible rules for 
spectrum management, to clarify technology and service neutrality principles as applied to 
spectrum, issues related to the liberalization of spectrum, the rules for spectrum trading, as 
well as issues related to switchover from analogue to digital terrestrial broadcasting, having as 
target date 2012. However, currently there is no general and coherent strategy for spectrum 
management at national level. 
The situation of frequency allocation in key bands in Romania is as follows: 
• the UHF band is mostly allocated to non-governmental use, mostly to broadcasting 
(analogical/terrestrial TV) and radio microphones, but some sub-bands are still used for 
military purposes. Importantly, the band 479-862 MHz will soon be reviewed for 
possible future applications after the introduction of DVB-T. 
• the 900 MHz and 1800 MHz bands are allocated to GSM usage39. Two GSM licences 
were awarded through beauty contest in 1996 to Mobil Rom and Mobilfon, each for a 
total of $50 million. Cosmorom was the first GSM-1800 operator, launched 
commercially in March 2000 (later re-launched as Cosmote in 2005). Cosmorom’s 
licence in the 1800 MHz band will expire in 2009. 
• in the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands, two players (Vodafone and Orange) secured 5-year 3G 
licences in November 2004. In October 2006, RCS & RDS and the CDMA450 operator 
Zapp (Telemobil) won two additional 3G licences. The cost of the 3G licence awarded 
by IGCTI was set at the equivalent of $35 million, for a duration of 15 years. 
                                                 
39 Telemobil operates a CDMA network in the 450 MHz band, offering mobile voice and Internet services. 
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Operators have to pay a yearly fee for spectrum usage, and have to cover three 
development stages with the following deadlines: June 30, 2008, December 31, 2009 
and December 31, 2011. 
• The 2.5 GHz band is currently used for military applications, at least until there will be 
requests for UMTS use of these bands. It is not clear how long would it take to free up 
these bands should these requests arrive. 
• 3.5 GHz and 3.7 GHz bands. As of October 2006, seven operators held 10 national 
licences for services in the 3.5 GHz band, while five operators held 175 local licences. 
The Romanian government has launched a national broadband plan to deploy 
technologies such as WiMAX in Romania, by setting precise steps: these include 
auctioning two national licences in the 3.7 MHz frequency band, with duration until 
2013. It is interesting to note that if the winners of 3.7 GHz licences also happen to hold 
licences in the 3.5 GHz band, they would have to renounce these. Holders of the 3.5 
GHz licences have been invited to issue proposals to reorganize spectrum in that band: 
IGCTI launched a public consultation in October 2006 to test the interest of operators 
for new technologies using these frequencies. In mid-2007, two national ‘advanced 
services’ licences in the 3.5 GHz band in 2007 were auctioned. In the medium term, 
IGCTI (now ANRCTI) plans to adopt the EU and ITU decisions and regulations 
regarding the 3.5 GHz and 3.7 GHz frequency bands. Moreover, it was announced that 
after 2013 there shall be only 3-4 national licences in the 3.5 MHz frequency band 
(compared to the current ten). In any event, no licence holder in the 3.5 GHz and 3.7 
GHz frequency bands will be allowed to hold a cumulated spectrum larger than 2x28 
MHz (spectrum cap); and no licence holder for these frequency bands shall be entitled 
to simultaneously own local and national licences in both the 3.5 GHz and 3.7 GHz 
frequency bands. 
In summary, current developments in Romania suggest that, due to a limited centralization of 
spectrum in the past years and the absence of a coherent and rigid national spectrum policy, 
there may be sufficient spectrum available to deploy advanced technologies in the future, and 
legal constraints at national level do not seem insurmountable. The pro-competitive 
provisions adopted by IGCTI in the past year leave room for hope as regards the feasibility of 
implementing Commission proposals. Thanks to this approach, by mid-2008 Romania will 
have two operators in the 410-450 MHz band, three operators in the 900 MHz band, three 
operators in the 1800 MHz band, four 3G operators, broadband services in 3.5 GHz and 3.7 
GHz frequency band40. The reorganization and refarming of spectrum in the UHF band will 
be an essential step as regards Commission proposals on the digital dividend; whereas the 
conditions to access the 2.5 GHz band have to be clarified. 
3.4.3 Sweden 
The National Post and Telecom Agency (Post- och telestyrelsen/PTS)41 is the authority that 
monitors the electronic communications and postal sectors in Sweden, with ‘electronic 
communications’ covering telecommunications, IT and radio. PTS is a public authority 
reporting to the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications. 
                                                 
40 See speech by Mr. Catalin Marinescu (president of IGCTI), European Communications in Romania, 17 
October 2007, available at http://www.anrc.ro. 
41 http://www.pts.se. 
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The authority is an independent agency according to the Swedish public authority model, such 
that the government is not allowed govern how PTS should apply an act42. 
The authority aims to administer spectrum so that it provides the greatest possible level of use 
and social benefit, to promote innovation, the development of technology and a broader range 
of wireless-based services. A number of points have been formulated with the aim of 
achieving this, among others, that43: 
• Licences to use radio transmitters shall be as technology and service neutral as possible 
• When selection procedures are required, an auction should be applied in the first 
instance 
• Second-hand trading (transfer of licences) shall be promoted 
• Licence exemption should be introduced where there is little risk of harmful interference 
and there are no other impediments 
• The rights and obligations of the licence holder should be clear and not be changed 
without notice and good reasons 
• A minimum of administrative burdens shall be imposed on licence holders  
• The application procedure should be simplified through the use of relevant IT tools, for 
example, web applications 
• Spectrum allocation shall be harmonized with other countries as far as this is possible 
Thus PTS agrees with the European Commission that central planning of the spectrum often 
fails to satisfy the principles of the greatest possible social benefit, accessibility and 
promotion of innovation. Examples of exceptions to this, where central planning or variants 
thereof will continue to be required in the future, include radio use for public safety (for 
example, the police, the armed forces, emergency services) and certain international 
harmonized radio use (for example, civil aviation, maritime traffic, space/satellite 
communication, research). PTS must also, in accordance with Swedish Law, consider to the 
greatest possible extent freedom of expression (use of broadcasting) and the needs of 
prioritized users (the armed forces and the police). 
For many other – not least commercial – services, society's benefit from the use will be 
greatest if the spectrum is used for the services for which demand is the greatest. Therefore, 
PTS considers that technology and service-neutral licences, auction assignments, second-hand 
trading and licence charges in proportion to the use of the resources should be used to a 
greater extent. 
Sweden supports the Commission’s proposal on spectrum trading44. However, it appears that 
the Commission limits the proposal to refer to certain frequency bands identified by the 
Commission and Member States. Sweden takes the view that it is possible to go even further 
and state that the general principle, in all bands, is that it should be possible to transfer 
licences. 
                                                 
42 The Swedish constitution prohibits against interference by a government minister in a government agency - 
see Regeringsformen SFS 1974:152, Chapter 11, §7. 
43 See PTS Spectrum Policy, PTS-VR-2006: 2, 10 December 2006, 
http://www.pts.se/Archive/Documents/EN/Spektrumpolicy_eng.pdf. 
44 See Swedish Reply to Public Consultation on the Review of EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services,  
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/public_consult/review_2/comments/swedish_i
nput_e_com_review.pdf. 
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Current and possible future allocation of frequencies in key bands include: 
• In the 450 MHz band, PTS awarded a 15-year licence to Nordisk Mobiltelefon in 2005 
to build a digital mobile telephone network, following an auction and a winning bid of 
about €9 million. 
• Regarding digital switchover, Sweden is one of the most advanced countries having 
switched off analogue signals on 15 October 2007. PTS has concluded that at least 189 
MHz can be released through the switch-off of analogue television broadcasting, with 
112 MHz available in the attractive 470 – 862 MHz band. Nevertheless, PTS has not 
rushed to decide how to allocate these frequencies, believing that it would be beneficial 
if European countries can coordinate use of parts or all of this spectrum.   
• The 900 MHz and 1800 MHz bands are allocated to GSM. Three licences were awarded 
in 1992, now held by Tele 2, Telia Sonera and Vodafone. A fourth licence in the 900 
MHz band was awarded in 2004 to the sole bidder, Swefour, to set up a network and 
offer capacity to companies and operators that lack their own mobile networks.  
• In the 1.9G Hz-2.1 GHz bands, PTS awarded four 15-year 3G licences in 2000 through 
a ‘beauty contest’, licence winners being charged a nominal fee of about €11,000 each 
plus 0.15% of annual turnover. The successful applicants were Europolitan, later 
Vodafone, the Swedish operations of which were later acquired by Telenor, HI3G (now 
3), Orange and Tele2. Telia and Tele2 gave notice after some time that they would share 
Tele2’s licence through a venture now called SUNAB (Svenska UMTS Nät AB). 
Europolitan (now Telenor) and Hi3G (now 3) also decided to collaborate on the rollout 
and to build parts of their network together. In 2004 Orange withdrew from the market 
and its licence was revoked following unsuccessful attempts to sell its licence. The 
original license requirement was that, by December 2003, 99.98% of the Swedish 
population should have access to 3G signals, according a specific technical formula, 
which later was revised. All licence holders have struggled to meet their roll-out 
obligations and by 2003 coverage was between 67.5 and 74% of the promised 
population coverage. Amended technical requirements mean that operators have now 
met their coverage obligations. 
• PTS has been conducting an ‘interest survey’ and consultation regarding licences in the 
frequency bands 1900–1905 and 2500–2690 MHz and intends to issue national licences 
for future wireless applications through an auction planned for the first half of 2008. 
• In the 3.6-3.8 GHz-band, PTS plans to assign 1,160 licences in a web-based auction in 
November 2007. There are four licences per Swedish municipality; two FDD licences of 
2x20 MHz each and two TDD licences of 40 MHz each. The licences are technology 
and service-neutral and do not contain any rollout obligations. The purpose of this 
assignment is to create opportunities for operators to build broadband networks, to 
increase supply and competition in the broadband market. 
In conclusion, Sweden could be viewed as having adopted a wide range of spectrum 
management principles and methods, but in recent years it has moved increasingly toward 
market-based solutions (auctions, trading) and supported service and technical neutrality. 
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3.4.4 United Kingdom 
Ofcom45 is the regulator and competition authority for the UK communications industries, 
and is responsible for ensuring the optimal use of the electro-magnetic spectrum. It was 
established in December 2003, assuming the duties of five separate industry regulators, 
including Oftel and the Radiocommunications Agency46. Ofcom has a statutory duty: a) to 
further the interests of citizens in relation to communications matters; and (b) to further the 
interests of consumers in relevant markets, where appropriate by promoting competition. The 
Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 (WT Act) brought together into a single statute the legislation 
under which Ofcom now manages the radio spectrum47. 
Although Ofcom is responsible for the management of all spectrum, whether used by the 
public or private sector, a standing Cabinet Office committee, the UK Spectrum Strategy 
Committee (UKSSC) has the lead responsibility for coordinating government spectrum 
policy. UKSSC is jointly chaired by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of 
Defence and comprises representatives of interested government departments. Ofcom is not a 
formal member of UKSSC since it is not a government department but it is generally 
represented at committee meetings. Ofcom is not obliged to abide by UKSSC decisions but 
most seem to be implemented on a consensual basis48. The UKSSC also coordinates 
international spectrum policy between government and Ofcom. 
Historically in the UK, almost all spectrum was managed through a traditional ‘command and 
control’ method. In recent years this has been relaxed in three ways, following its Spectrum 
Framework Review (SFR) in 200449, which built on the earlier independent Cave review of 
Radio Spectrum Management for the Department of Trade & Industry and the Treasury in 
200150. First, auctions have been used to assign spectrum, notably in the case of 3G 
licences51. Ofcom now uses auctions as the principal means of assigning spectrum, where 
demand for the spectrum is likely to exceed supply. However, occasionally, for strong public 
policy reasons, Ofcom may choose a different method such as comparative selection. 
Second, the introduction of secondary trading in December 2004 enables holders of WT Act 
licences to transfer all or part of their rights and obligations to another party. Also, since 
January 2005, spectrum liberalization has allowed licence holders to request a variation to 
certain licence conditions. Perusal of the Ofcom secondary trading web pages, however, 
shows that there have been very few genuine trades so far52. 
Third, some new allocations have been set aside for licence-exempt use, for example at 5 
GHz. Ofcom must exempt radio stations, equipment or apparatus where interference is not 
likely or is contrary to an international obligation. Figure 8 shows the weighted use of the 
spectrum, with defence and fixed services dominating overall usage. 
                                                 
45 http://www.ofcom.org.uk. 
46 Ofcom assumed the duties of Office of Telecommunications (Oftel), the Broadcasting Standards Authority, 
the Radiocommunications Agency, the Independent Television Commission (ITC) and the Radio Authority. 
47 The new Act replaced the Wireless Telegraphy Acts 1949, 1967 and 1998, the Marine etc Broadcasting 
(Offences) Act 1967, Part 6 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 and certain provisions of the Communications 
Act 2003. Acts of Parliament can be found at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts.htm. 
48 Independent Audit of Spectrum Holdings, Emerging Issues: A Consultation Document, July 2005, p.8. 
49 http://www.ofcom.org.uk/radiocomms/sfr/. 
50 http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/ra/spectrum-review/index.htm. 
51 The five 3G licences auctioned in 2000 raised £22.5 billion for the UK treasury. 
52 See http://146.101.202.225/public-tnr/tradeDetails.do. Of the 20 transactions listed on 13 November 2007, 7 
were withdrawn and 6 appear to refer to a minor change to the licence holder’s name.  
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Figure 8: UK spectrum use weighted by frequency. 
 
Source: Ofcom, 
Note: 1MHz allocation at 100MHz is given equal weighting to a 10MHz allocation at 1GHz. 
Current and possible future allocation of frequencies in key bands include: 
• In the 412-414 MHz and 422-424 MHz bands, Ofcom awarded a licence to Arqiva 
through an auction. The auction was for 4 MHz of spectrum in four lots; Arqiva won all 
four lots with a bid of £1,500,025. The licence, which is effective immediately, is 
technology and service neutral; this means that the licensee has the freedom to use the 
spectrum how it wishes, within certain technical limits. 
• UHF band. In December 2006, Ofcom’s published its Digital Dividend Review53 setting 
out proposal to use the spectrum released by digital switchover in the sought-after UHF 
band in the frequencies 470-862 MHz. Ofcom has already reserved 256 MHz of this 
spectrum for digital television broadcasting, meaning that about 128 MHz is available 
for a variety of potential uses, including advanced wireless services and more digital TV 
(including high definition TV). Ofcom is currently considering responses to its 
consultation and the next steps but is broadly committed to a market-based approach 
through auctions for this spectrum. 
• the 900 MHz and 1800 MHz bands are allocated to GSM, four licences being awarded 
to Vodafone, BT Cellnet (nowO2), Orange and One2One (now T-Mobile) between 1992 
and 1994 with no expiry date. More recently, in 2006 Ofcom awarded 12 licences for 
cellular spectrum at the top end of the 1800 MHz band for low power pico-cell GSM, 
total fees for all licences only reaching £3.8 million. 
• in the 1452-1492 MHz (L Band), Ofcom plans to award spectrum by auction, existing 
fixed link services being obliged to vacate the band by 31 December 2007. This 
spectrum has a wide range of potential uses including mobile multimedia (using DVB-H 
or DMB), broadband wireless access (using TDD-IP and WiMAX), terrestrial digital 
broadcasting (T-DAB), special events (PMSE) services and satellite digital radio (S-
DAB). Uncertainty caused by concern over interference has delayed the award. 
                                                 
53 http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/ddr/ddrmain.pdf. 
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• in the 1.9G Hz-2.1 GHz bands, five UMTS 20-year licences were awarded by auction  
to five operators (Orange, Vodafone, O2, T-Mobile, and Hutchison 3G) at a total cost of 
£22.5 billion. Operators were obliged to ensure 80% national coverage by December 
2007, a target that seems unlikely to be met by all operators as they focus attention on 
covering metropolitan areas. 
• 2500-2690 MHz and 2010-2025 MHz, Ofcom has publishes a discussion document with 
updated technical and auction design proposals for the award of the 2.6 GHz and 2010 
MHz bands. It is proposed to consider the band 2290-2300 MHz separately. 
• Ofcom also expects to make a number of awards in bands over 3 GHz during the next 
few years. These include the possibility of further awards at 3.6-4.2 GHz (part) 10 GHz, 
28 GHz, 32 GHz, and 40 GHz. 
In summary, Ofcom has been in the forefront of application of a market-based approach to 
spectrum management and has been influential in shaping thinking in the European 
Commission.  Perhaps because it considers it is ‘leading the field’, Ofcom and the UK 
generally tend to pursue its own course to the detriment of European harmonization. 
3.5 Legal limits of the proposed reforms and future models 
As we can see from the examples we have described, spectrum management regimes vary 
considerably in the EU-27. Some countries have made significant steps towards a market-
based approach and assignment through auctions, whereas other still rely almost exclusively 
on administrative methods and beauty contests. In addition, some countries are more 
advanced than others in use of unlicensed spectrum.  
The most significant legal constraints for the implementation the Commission proposals 
towards a more coherent EU spectrum policy are found at national level, especially due to: 
• legacy issues, mostly arising from the method chosen to assign individual usage rights 
(e.g. beauty contest, auction, hybrid models), which results in differing economic values 
for frequency bands and networks; 
• lack of flexibility in some existing licences, particularly because of long duration of 
licences or excessive technological prescriptions; 
• the protection of certain public policy objectives, e.g. for services of general economic 
interest, which include Public Service Broadcasting, as well as emergency or safety-of-
life services; 
• current use of bands by non-communications services, e.g. governmental, military or 
scientific use. 
Understandably the heterogeneity across the Member States limits the ability to harmonise 
policy across the EU. Error! Reference source not found. summarises the options and 
constraints for harmonization across the EU in key spectrum bands. The potential for 
spectrum fragmentation across the Member States is highlighted by the difference in approach 
to the digital dividend. Although digital switchover is due to be completed by all Member 
States by 2012, the process is characterized by Member States moving at different speeds, 
with different views on how much spectrum will be released, what it should be used for, and 
how it should be allocated. Using some of this spectrum for pan-European services would 
require a harmonized approach that will not materialize without much greater central 
coordination. 
The Commission’s package on reform of the regulatory framework for e-communications 
includes a new European Telecom Market Authority to support the Commission and national 
telecoms regulators. 
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However, with regard to spectrum regulation, what might be more appropriate is a European-
level facilitator or coordinating body to help assure a common approach to spectrum 
requirements across the EU, as outlines in Chapter 1. 
On the question of best spectrum management model for the future, the EU and the Member 
States are still at the beginning of a process of reform and liberalization. It seems likely that in 
the future there will not be one single approach that will be best in all circumstances and that 
more likely is a mix of traditional administrative assignment combined with both more market 
orientation as well as an unlicensed/commons approach wherever feasible. The challenge for 
future spectrum management in the EU is how to achieve the appropriate mix of these 
approaches. This is explored in more detail in Chapter 4. 
Table 10 Existing options and constraints for EU-wide spectrum harmonization 
Frequency 
band 
Advantage Timing of 
availability 
Existing constraints Possibility of 
EU-wide 
harmonisation 
Current/proposed 
action 
174-230 
MHz  
Coverage Long 
Many years 
needed to release 
TV spectrum in 
many MS 
T-DAB 
spectrum: early 
for countries not 
having 
introduced T-
DAB or for 
systems 
operating within 
T-DAB data 
capacity 
National level 
T-DAB assignment/ allotment 
limits technologies 
Existing T-DAB licences and 
analogue and digital TV: 
licences in some countries 
WRC-07 relaxed some of these 
constraints 
Low  
(at least until 
2012) 
ITU level 
Low constraints in 
GE-06. 
WRC-07 assigned 
band III (ch. 61-
69) to DTT. 
National level 
Member states 
should take action 
to increase 
flexibility in 
licences. 
470-862 
MHz 
(Band IV/V) 
(upper limit 
changes in 
some MS) 
Coverage. 
Potentially 
significant 
amount of 
spectrum 
Long 
Several years in 
most countries 
 
WRC/RRC decisions 
Proximity of higher channels 
to 900 MHz 2G spectrum for 
dual band handsets. 
EU level 
Soon to be partially 
harmonised by binding EU 
legislation (3 sub-bands, 
neutrality). 
National level 
Existing analogue and digital 
licences for TV. 
Coexistence of fixed-roof top 
and indoor portable reception. 
Low  
(until 2012) 
ITU level  
WRC-07 assigned 
the 430-435Mhz, 
435-438Mhz, 450-
450Mhz and 790-
862Mhz  to IMT. 
EU level 
Communication on 
dig. dividend: two 
thirds of the UHF 
band coordinated 
at EU level. 
National level 
Need for national 
action to make 
licences more 
flexible.  
865-868 
MHz 
Use for 
RFID 
Early EU level 
Harmonised for RFID use by 
Decision 2006/804/EC 
Harmonised  
1452-1492 
MHz 
(L-Band) 
Availability.  
Significant 
spectrum 
amount 
 
Early 
Unused in most 
countries 
ITU/CEPT level 
MA02 limits to T-DAB (or 
systems within that mask); 
some licensed T-DAB use but 
very limited;  
 
High  ITU/CEPT level 
Confirm mask 
approach; review 
possibility of 
accommodating 
wider-band 
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Frequency 
band 
Advantage Timing of 
availability 
Existing constraints Possibility of 
EU-wide 
harmonisation 
Current/proposed 
action 
Suitable also 
for indoor 
reception 
ITU satellite allocation and 
existing filings in the band 
1467-1492 MHz. 
CEPT ECC/DEC (03)02 
decision for satellite use in the 
band 1479.5-1492 MHz. 
National level 
Restrictions from other 
countries outside EU limit 
possible use of this band in 
some Member States. 
technologies within 
Maastricht 
framework or 
consider more 
radical review. 
EU level 
Mandate to CEPT 
for EU 
harmonisation of 
the band 1452 – 
1479.5 MHz (lower 
part of the L-band) 
for mobile 
multimedia 
services. 
1800 MHz  
(1785-1805 
or part 
thereof) 
Availability  
 
Early  
(At least for 
1800-1805) 
EU level 
Lower part of the band (1785-
1800 MHz) harmonized for 
SRD. 
Limited amount of spectrum, if 
constrained to top 5 MHz. 
High 
(at least for 
upper 5MHz) 
 
Avoid limitations 
on use. 
IMT-
2000/UMTS 
“core 
band” 
(1900-1920 
MHz and 
2010-2025 
MHz) 
Availability Early CEPT/EU level 
CEPT ECC/DEC/(06)01 
decision on UMTS/IMT-2000 
National level 
Existing UMTS licences. 
High To be opened for 
broadcast services. 
2GHz MSS Significant 
spectrum 
amount 
 CEPT/EU level 
CEPT ECC/DEC/(97)03 
decision on MSS 
1980 -2010 MHz (earth-to-
space) and 2170-2200 MHz 
(space-to-earth) harmonised 
for MSS by Commission 
decision 2007/98/EC. 
High Harmonised. 
2.5 - 2.69 
GHz 
Availability 
by 2008, 
international
ly 
harmonized, 
large 
amount 
Early 
(2008, subject to 
market demand 
and national 
licensing 
schemes) 
CEPT/EU 
CEPT ECC/DEC/(05)05 on 
UMTS/IMT-2000 identifying 
harmonized utilization of 
spectrum in the frequency 
band. 
2500 – 2690 MHz for 
terrestrial IMT-2000/UMTS 
(after WRC-07, IMT includes 
WiMAX). 
National level 
Some countries prefer to 
constrain to IMT-2000, others 
prefer a technology neutral 
approach. Rules regarding in-
band cross-border 
coordination and out-of-band 
compatibility to be developed. 
High Accommodate 
WiMAX and 
MBMS services. 
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4. ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS AND TECHNICAL LIMITS 
4.1 Technical neutrality and spectrum usage 
4.1.1 Demand for services, today and tomorrow, by radio protocol 
Today’s demand for radio- based services is changing faster than it has done for a hundred 
years. Signalling protocol types are one of the major areas of development as the new services 
enter. Principal entrants are the following: 
WiFi: the IEEE 802.11x standard can run at various frequencies (often in unlicensed bands at 
around 2.4 GHz) and has grown ubiquitously globally and especially in the EU, as the 
preferred Internet link of choice for wireless LANs, with hubs in public spaces as much as 
homes and offices. Volume production has bought the cost of such radio hubs down from 
over €500 to under €30 for the simplest in some Member States. This is complemented by 
radio interface cards and now radio chips inside PCs, and almost all laptops. It is so important 
that all microprocessor chip manufacturers now include a WiFi chip in their standard chipset, 
while its data speeds have increased from 10 Mbps to around 100 Mbps. They increasingly 
form the basis of office and public building/ campus networks for millions of users. 
WiMAX: The new longer range technology at the level of a metropolitan area, WiMAX IEEE 
802.16, has been driven by the chip manufacturers (principally Intel) to open new 
microprocessor markets and offers over 100 Mbps over a simple spread spectrum coding. 
National and city-wide networks are likely over the next decade. It can operate in the 
unlicensed bands. But with technology neutrality it could operate in other bands – for instance 
this year the ITU agreed that it could operate as an alternative over certain 3G UMTS (IMT -
2000) licensed bands. This is may well be a major new standard for longer range networking, 
challenging established cellular mobile protocols. New standards in the WiMAX area may 
appear, especially if there are intellectual property conflicts over its technology, linked to 
algorithms with patents owned by Qualcomm (Flash-OFDM – orthogonal frequency division 
multiplexing). These new protocols might use licensed bands but roll-out would be far faster 
without waiting for international agreements on a suitable slot but instead operate in an 
unlicensed band. 
Short-range networks: At the low-range end of the protocols, industrial sensor networks are 
now appearing with standards for low-rate data transfer – principally ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4) 
using unlicensed bands, in the ISM range – and also the proprietary ZWave. Other networks 
are the RFID protocols at a range of frequencies that change by global region, for logistics 
and retail mostly today, and also the emergence of consumer devices from MP3 player 
headsets to mobile phone networking using the Bluetooth protocol with 1 Mbps transfer rates. 
There are also newer developments in the short-range market, with various UWB protocols 
being launched over the next few years. Many of their applications will be in medical 
environments for vital signs monitoring etc, using personal area networks (PANs). All of 
these will use the unlicensed bands as the shortest route to market, even they later won an 
agreed slot place in the spectrum. 
Other developments include convergence of fixed and mobile networks using a ‘next 
generation network' (NGN) designed for this, with all-IP traffic. Also small area coverage 
hubs (Femto cells) for a house or small office which integrate various protocols are appearing. 
They integrate various mobile protocols (GSM, CDMA, UMTS and WiMAX, WiFi, or other) 
with fixed line access. Their aim is to act in a repeater or extender mode as mobile 
communications become an indoor phenomenon –half of mobile calls are being made indoors 
and more for data applications.  
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Increasingly they will be seen as bridge from fixed mobile convergence (FMC) towards fixed 
to mobile substitution. Some market indications are that 20% of Western Europe has already 
opted for mobile only, while 18% more users are considering mobile only and two-thirds of 
EU citizens would use mobile at home if price was the same as fixed (Airvana, 2007). 
4.1.2 Promises today and tomorrow 
Mobile cellular protocols have not advanced too far, following the 3G debacle aggravated by 
the IPR difficulties of both 3G-WCDMA and CDMA. Higher data rates have come with 
enhancements (HSU/DPA – high speed up/down link packet access) for 3G, and for 2G with 
GPRS and EDGE enhancements, all in their various ITU-agreed GSM and UMTS licensed 
bands. Really we await the new technologies mentioned above to succeed these cellular 
technologies in some form. That may be a type of 4G mobile ‘mesh’ or ad hoc networks 
which could run over any support protocol, be it WiMAX, WiFi or a new contender, with a 
software layer on top (e.g. that from UK-based LocustWorld). Enormous research efforts are 
going on in this area54, in China and Japan as much as the EU or the USA. What is clear is 
that unlicensed bands would benefit these technologies, for reasons of freedom to start up and 
experiment, and time to market. 
Thus future spectrum demands are for technical and service neutrality, so that we may 
exchange existing protocols for new ones and also may enlarge the unlicensed bands as their 
load become greater. New services (as covered in Chapter 2) will have strong potential 
impacts on technical neutrality, as the higher data rate services are taken up. They could be 
run over various carriers, be they mobile, WiFi, or WiMAX, perhaps with a progression to 
higher data rates and longer range. These new services will be closely linked to EU-level 
networking and so the constraints will be on assuring compatibilities between services run on 
top of different protocols. For instance, access to email over a WiFi service in the home 
should be no different from receiving it over WiMAX while away from the home network. 
4.1.3 Benefits for EU consumers and their lifestyles 
The benefits of EU-level networking and technical neutrality will bring benefits to both 
citizens and industry through increased productivity (e.g. see Forge, S. et al, 2007). As many 
researchers have shown, mobile communications have major externalities on all other sectors 
of the economy. So from a cost-benefit perspective, driving the EU economy further in terms 
of GDP growth and employment depends to some extent on the productivity advantage of 
mobile services.  
The social benefit of terrestrial broadcast for news and entertainment is also present. But its 
importance is diminishing as alternative channels to viewer, notably CATV, satellite 
broadcast, and in the future, webcasts with IPTV over broadband (including perhaps fixed 
radio access) take over the entertainment market. 
4.2 International dimensions  
4.2.1 Consequences of proposed reforms and international ITU and other constraints  
The ultimate objectives of the international working are agreements on a set of frequency 
bands for both commercial and public service/military users to operate without constraining 
each other. Naturally this must occur in a manner which allows global interworking and 
where appropriate, volume manufacturing for a global consumer market.  
                                                 
54 For a detailed analysis of developments, journals such as the IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing and 
IEEE Computing’s Pervasive Computing journal should be perused. 
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Moreover this has to be flexible in that the legacy of previous equipment and regulation can 
be smoothly transformed to the needs of the 21st century. 
However it is unlikely that the international dimension for a resource considered as more 
valuable than water by some can be quickly changed to accommodate new technology and 
services. Pressures from industry groups anxious to exploit new radio technology are having a 
gradual impact. But they face the inertia of a system of regulatory spectrum management 
based on the ITU WRC meetings at four-yearly intervals, a process designed for a different  
era of public services and incumbent telecommunications operators. Some basic 
reconsideration of the process may be called for by which spectrum is allocated through 
negotiations between nearly 200 countries. Simplification of the basic Radio Regulations 
would be required. This may be possible if far more use of unlicensed bands with suitable 
technical constraints are made available. 
4.2.2 Beyond EU borders without global re-planning – issues, costs and solutions 
One alternative to reforming the global procedures would be for the EU to pioneer new 
directions in spectrum regulation, going ahead without the rest of world at a much faster pace. 
However, this raises key issues for the EU and its neighbours. Issues are concerned with 
conflicts technically over interference and in politically sensitive applications – principally 
military and broadcast services, terrestrial and satellite, where interruption of media services 
might be construed as a political act.  
The coverage question for adjacent countries immediately becomes important. While cellular 
mobile may only have an overlap coverage of at most a few kilometres, with lower 
frequencies from the digital dividend, this could be up to 10 km or more, while newer 
technologies such as WiMAX could be even more – perhaps 20 km. However judicious base 
station siting and power level setting would presumably be used to limit overlaps to a few 
kilometres at most. The base station directional antennae can be set up so that the propagation 
lobes are oriented away from frontier crossings. The reverse issue, of other countries’ 
emissions clashing with the EU in differently utilised bands (e.g. TV broadcasts in digital 
dividend areas given over to mobile in the EU) is naturally a further effect to be considered, 
requiring a detailed band by band, geographic border analysis. 
A far bigger issue might be interference with a neighbour’s terrestrial broadcasting and 
perhaps even more, unrestrained satellite footprints from EU satellites. Content IPR issues are 
also relevant, as transmission rights may only have been procured for certain countries and 
other operators may have the rights outside the EU. Interference with broadcast media might 
even be seen as a hostile act in some way, if it interrupts, jams or even replaces political and 
cultural content. A second major issue that might be seen as somewhat aggressive would be 
overlap with reserved military spectrum in neighbour countries, since effective jamming 
might be perceived as some form of threat. 
Costs would consist of possible damage in monetary terms of disruption of military, political 
and ordinary services. Damages would have to be assessed case by case or possibly in some 
form of international arbitration. Impossible to estimate, they potentially could be high. 
Potential technical solutions are not straightforward but must be based on first understanding 
the new spectrum proposals against the major transmissions of neighbouring states and the 
potential seriousness of any interference, a function of the transmission being affected and its 
national priority. One technical solution, viable only for certain applications, might be in far 
wider usage of advanced spread spectrum signals. By their very nature, they may be 
undetectable in neighbouring countries, as typically they are below the ambient noise level at 
any frequency in the frontier regions of the neighbour. 
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Regulatory solutions might lie in reciprocal bilateral agreements with the most affected 
neighbouring states, for transmissions which are single frequency or frequency dependent. A 
draft spectrum plan for the EU could be presented, and its impacts examined against the 
national spectrum plans and agreements drawn up on power levels and reciprocal use on 
interleaving to give non-interfering strong frequencies. 
Overall impacts of going ahead unilaterally may be mitigated by the above approaches but 
would require a progressive approach to avoid major clashes with neighbouring spectrum 
regimes.  The advantages for the EU would be economic, from early deployment of new radio 
technologies, without waiting for the far slower worldwide negotiation process. 
4.3 Implementation – Big Bang or planned transition? 
4.3.1 Options for implementation 
Implementation of proposed spectrum reforms and their overall impacts need to be considered 
in the context of the future EU economy and society. Specifically we consider whether there 
is a need for an accelerated pace of reform and note that changeover would be principally in 
the major areas of: 
1. Neutrality on technology and services for any band. 
2. Harmonized regulation of spectrum allocations and allocation mechanisms across all 
EU member states. 
3. Increased use of unlicensed bands to form a spectrum commons. 
4. Introduction of market-based allocation with auctions and secondary trading. 
5. A central EU facilitator to co-ordinate spectrum related issues, with a central EU 
database registry of users and their usages by frequency. 
6. Introduction of financial incentives for public sector users to give up spectrum. 
7. Rebalancing of existing usages of the spectrum, specifically the digital dividend.  
The major options for implementation of spectrum policy include: 
• A single major change event or ‘big bang’ for all the EU. 
• A progressive implementation of reforms, with a planned transition for the above list 
one at a time (or several together, if it makes better sense) across the EU. A possible 
first step would be endorsing the central facilitator and registry to organise the other 
measures in a programme of reform. 
• A staged implementation, either in geographic blocks (e.g. Benelux countries, or 
Iberian, or Baltic states) or by individual Member State as a series of phases, with a 
target end date. Member States may reform at their own rate, within limits.  
4.3.2 Policy discussion: the practical limits today and tomorrow 
The pros and cons of each option are analysed below using a SWOT analysis.  
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Table 10: Options for implementation of spectrum reform in the EU 
A major single change event or ‘big bang’ 
Strengths  
Simple, clear.  
Weaknesses 
Unlikely to succeed as too much change at once. 
Requires enormous organization. 
Requires co-operation of all interested parties and 
vested interests. 
Opportunities 
May push the EU to the forefront quickly 
in technical and economic returns. 
Threats 
Lack of agreement by vested interests in one MS 
could derail whole change event across the EU. 
High risk - could cause the whole reform to be 
abandoned, as viability of change would be 
undermined and its failures would be evident. 
The above might leave EU in a spectrum mess of 
half-finished measures, different in each MS. 
A progressive implementation, by reform, with a planned transition across the EU  
Strengths  
Allow for differences to be ironed out for 
each measure. 
Progressive change gives time needed to 
persuade interested parties.  
Weaknesses 
Lengthy process and may meet further delays as 
some MS might try to slow process for certain they 
view as unwelcome measures.  
 
Opportunities 
Better planning - a far stronger EU 
spectrum agreement and support plus 
understanding of reforms. 
Threats 
Cannot get agreement in some MS, despite major 
pressures, due to vested interests. 
Patchwork of reforms. 
A staged implementation, in geographic blocks or by Member State 
Strengths  
Allows each MS to move at own pace.  
Should gather consensus of all MS. 
Weaknesses 
Longer and may meet delays as each MS or group 
of MS takes time to agree to reforms 
Opportunities 
Smooth transition as each MS has time to 
put own house in order. 
Peer pressure to achieve reforms, if use 
published scorecards. 
Threats 
Failure of some MS to agree at all - patchwork of 
reforms, with all of the EU at different stages of 
reform, and moving slowly. 
4.3.3 The preferred option with supporting arguments 
From the above, it would seem that the second or third options are viable. The second option 
may be the most pragmatic in getting the EU to move forward on reforms at a set of common 
stages, led by a central facilitator for coordinating the Member States and a reform 
programme. The first option appears unrealistic in that doing everything at once may give one 
chance only – a single point of failure for everything. Thus it is high risk, and also requires 
enormous preparation and organization with agreement of all interested parties. 
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The EC commissioned report on secondary trading (Analysys, 2004) noted that 30% of the 
possible benefits will only be realised if all Member States move together. Thus a European 
dimension of new allocation mechanisms is important but so much change should be effected 
as a series of reforms, rather than one. 
4.4 Co-existence in the same band - limits and possibilities 
4.4.1 Sub-band identification and related issues 
Currently there is a different overall allocation pattern by Member State within which are 
global and regional agreements, e.g. for GSM, UMTS mobile and certain other functions such 
as TV channels and IMS bands. Introducing a more flexible spectrum use rests on the 
technologically neutral definition of the spectrum right itself. Such a redefinition must 
consider the interference environment present and then adduce sufficient controls that existing 
services, at least, would be able to operate. Part of this might be to identify sub-bands suitable 
for refarming (suitable politically as well as technically) and particularly identified for a 
possible common form of allocation. 
Today’s technology in widespread use does not yet permit sharing the same frequencies to 
any great extent. That does not mean we should not anticipate such a development, as 
considered in the next section, but that we have to move to new technology gradually. 
The next step therefore, in what is really an iterative process, is to examine whether 
interference controls can be steadily relaxed as new technology, appears for sharper cut-offs 
and for full sharing, and what effect that might have on other users. Regulators will have to 
apply judgement as to the level of risk they are prepared to accept that interference might 
arise as a result of the proposed relaxation from a command and control situation. Either new 
divisions for unlicensed bands may be introduced, or in bands with a secondary trading 
regime, the market might be left to negotiate further changes to interference parameters 
amongst itself, albeit that the regulator may be required to agree and register any changes 
proposed. For instance some NRAs where trading is primarily considered (e.g. the UK’s 
Ofcom) have reviewed this model. The NRA then attempts to determine uses (or property 
rights in the case of trading). For instance, the 900 MHz GSM band has been examined to see 
what conditions would need to be relaxed or applied to permit W-CDMA to also operate in 
the band and we can expect examples of this approach to increase. 
4.4.2 Constraints and possibilities for frequency co-planning 
A model as outlined above considers the specific interference environment present and must 
be country specific. One might expect to see similar levels of relaxation introduced where 
environments themselves are similar but a harmonized use or even property right for any 
particular frequency band across the EU is unlikely today, but should be envisaged for 
tomorrow. However, this would require far more co-ordinated action at the EU level, hence 
there is a need for a co-ordinating EU facilitator. 
To reach the ultimate goal of maximizing economic use with far more sharing, potential 
future directions should be led by a regulatory and organizational drive to a technical solution. 
One way forward would be to agree on bands (e.g. UHF) and within the bands, sub-bands 
which would be earmarked for re-allocation or refarming, especially below 3 GHz and 
particularly below 1 GHz. 
They would be divided as different allocation regimes: 
• Managed command and control allocation, usually for military and public service for 
services based on sole-use-of-frequency technologies. 
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• Traded spectrum rights with a licence to hold the spectrum and operate any service over 
any technology which respected the interference criteria, usually for sole usage 
applications but with secondary and primary user structure for interleaving, overlays and 
‘borrowing’ when not in use; largely for legacy protocols e.g. GSM. 
• Unlicensed bands, increasingly using spectrum sharing. 
Agreements required would have to be at an EU level and also pursued at a regional level to 
encompass neighbouring states. The organizational structure would be of that given in outline 
in Chapter 2 in looking at pan-European services. A key point to note is that such EU-wide 
agreements across the three categories could not be set in stone. With the demands from 
accelerating developments in radio technology over the next two decades, the command and 
control band could be expected to shrink. Technology directions for the new services will 
depend far more on unlicensed bands. So progressively unlicensed would tend to expand, as 
licensed and managed command and control shrink. 
4.5 Technical compatibility - problems and consequences 
4.5.1 Diverse issues of reception, and down/uplink constraints 
The air interface is where reception considerations and constraints with current technologies 
are manifest and today there seem to be few choices. The above analysis relies on the 
traditional model with separation for interference reasons. It does not really take into account 
the advances in technical compatibility as technologies capable of sharing the same reaches of 
spectrum take hold. 
Today’s technology needs guard bands for mobile broadband (and for narrowband mobile 
services) to avoid interference between uplink transmissions and adjacent (downlink) 
broadcast transmissions. The width of a guard band depends on many factors and could even 
be more than 10 MHz (Doeven, 2007). Also a guard band is needed between the uplink and 
the downlink sub-band. The total guard bands and thus the unused spectrum may be quite 
wide (it might add up to several TV, that is DVB-T, channels of 8 MHz). However this is a 
moving target. Spectrum efficiency is a factor of digital signal processing technology (and the 
computing power behind it) which advances every year, so guard bands will tend to narrow in 
the future until they virtually disappear. Moreover we have to consider the end-to-end 
network optimization. This could include compression and bit-rate encoding per Hz which 
significantly cuts the bandwidth required to transport a communication, especially important 
for video. Moreover, interference of digital signals is also a factor of the signal processing 
techniques for identification in noise which can only be expected to advance. 
4.5.2 The promise of new technologies for sharing spectrum with existing systems 
Spectrum management in the future must give more emphasis to sharing, be it in direct forms 
or with interleaving and overlays based on several forms of sharing technique: 
• Time: temporal management of frequencies which are free to use on an ad hoc basis – 
using CR and frequency hopping. 
• Frequency: the standard approach but refined by advanced signal processing including 
compression and bit-rate encoding to use less bandwidth and narrower guard bands. 
• Signal to noise power: the ‘interference temperature’ and overlay/underlay approach of 
‘tolerable interference’. 
• No detectable power at one frequency: spread spectrum techniques. 
• Spatial: directional antenna that focus on communicating transceiver. 
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The technical and regulatory implications of this are manifold as we should envisage a far 
more flexible regime covering both unlicensed and licensed bands but possibly not managed 
command and control regions (for reasons of political and public safety factors) unless prior 
agreements in restricted bands can be achieved. 
More specifically, technical approaches to interference management include concepts of 
underlay and overlay, vacant slot filling (Shared Spectrum Company, 2004) and sharing. In 
November 2003, the FCC sought comment on the feasibility of implementing a so-called 
‘interference temperature’ model for quantifying and managing interference. The interference 
temperature model is intended to provide a more accurate measure of interference by taking 
into account the cumulative effects of all unreserved RF energy in a given environment. This 
approach to interference management fundamentally alters spectrum policies by focusing on 
the actual radio frequency interference environment confronted by receivers, instead of the 
transmitter operation. Interference temperature is of particular importance to the satellite 
industry. 
In the USA, the FCC proposed to introduce the concept first in frequencies where Fixed 
Satellite Service (FSS) uplinks are the predominant use, namely, portions of the C- and Ku- 
band, for a large number of unlicensed devices to operate in the target bands, with appropriate 
power levels. However, the US satellite industry was concerned about the implications 
interference temperature concepts have for satellite operations in the C- and Ku- uplink bands. 
The FCC believed that an interference temperature approach could be superior to its 
traditional focus on transmitter power and frequency to facilitate increased use of licensed 
spectrum by unlicensed devices and also provide greater protection and certainty for 
incumbent licensees by more accurately measuring actual interference in a given RF 
environment. However the whole concept of interference temperature is controversial because 
it may infringe substantially on existing licensees’ operations. 
In contrast, is the spectrum commons approach which also envisions use of increasingly 
intelligent end-user devices – decentralised intelligence – to dramatically increase spectrum 
sharing. One issue for a spectrum commons approach is the amount of detail or specificity 
that is contained in the rules and regulations intended to avert the tragedy of the commons, i.e. 
the over-use of a shared economic resource (Hatfield, 2005). Simple rules such as, listen for 
other users before you transmit, or, use only the minimum amount of power necessary to 
communicate, may help to reduce interference and improve utilization of the resource. 
Likewise, more complex rules limiting the types of signals that are transmitted might possibly 
make it easier for receivers to reject interference. 
At some point, however, detailed restrictions – no matter how well-formulated – may reduce 
the ability of innovators to progress. The fundamental advantage of the spectrum commons 
approach is its ability to respond quickly to changes in technology and the marketplace. It 
must not be lost through detailed restrictions. Thus, over-regulation is the enemy - spectrum 
managers face a trade-off between increased utilization of the resource in the short term and 
potential greater innovation in the longer term. 
4.5.3 Road map for an eco-system to progress with co-existing differing technologies 
To move forward it will be necessary to reach agreement on where best to place unlicensed 
bands in view of the progression of other users to new frequencies under spectrum reform. 
Here an economic analysis of where an EU agreement could place unlicensed spectrum is 
required. Even a relatively small shift could have significant economic consequences. It 
would then be implemented through performance limits on devices and testing for 
conformance. Thus the next step is towards defining fixed-boundary frequency bands, which 
should gradually be converted to either exclusive property rights, or to be part of the 
commons, with mechanisms for reversibility at some future point. 
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This division would entail establishing some robust measure of spectrum efficiency usage, in 
terms of optimizing the amount and economic value of communications that occur. 
All of this will need a common sense regulatory framework to avoid the chaos that might 
result in abandoning a national allocation system, and to also avoid opposition to reform 
based on its poor organization. Questions will have to be asked such as whether today’s 
(public) terrestrial and satellite broadcasting is in some way socially valuable and deserves 
special privileges, while the priorities are more obvious for public safety services. In the 
traded bands, attention must be paid to windfall profits from secondary trading against 
consumer welfare and the price of communications. 
The future framework for spectrum management may be founded on some basic measures 
such as a spectrum registry and an EU facilitator. Key areas to then consider and decide on 
include: trading standards for market-based allocations; privatization of public services 
including public safety communications; reserved spectrum for special interest groups; 
overlay rights, of ‘borrowing’ licensed spectrum; underlay rights, e.g. use of innovative 
technologies such as UWB; and the digital dividend allocations. Far more radical 
management restructuring, such as abolishing an EU facilitator and the NRAs and replacing 
all with a spectrum court, to deal with questions of allocation and conflicts over interference 
as has been suggested for the USA, does not seem at this time to be valuable.  
Instead we envisage a progressive managed transition to new usages of the spectrum in a 
gradual manner over the decades, with changing portion so the spectrum allotted to each form 
of assignment, as shown in the possible road map of Figure 9. 
Figure 9: A road map for a shared spectrum eco-system, 
Projections of percentages of each type of spectrum allocation
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusions  
The radio spectrum is an essential factor for economic progress in the EU – it is a key basis 
for future productivity, specifically when used for ICTs. But it has more than just commercial 
objectives – it has a social dimension. The value of the spectrum must be seen in the context 
of social trends and the public objectives for the well being of the citizen.  
As such there are implications for a true single market that are linked to spectrum governance 
for EU-wide uses. In order to build up all the economies in the EU-27 to be equally 
prosperous, especially to close the digital divide, spectrum management and assignment needs 
to be reviewed and revised. In this regard, a mobile Internet with optimal cost efficiency over 
a broadband bearer will become a prominent demand. However, fragmented regulation will 
make this more difficult to achieve. 
The current disposition of spectrum is inefficient. Older technologies have taken the prime 
spectrum at lower frequencies and with new technologies being developed there is now a need 
for spectrum reform. The prime bands at lower frequencies offer better propagation for much 
lower cost networking and superior building penetration for high bit rate services such as 
broadband (mobile, or fixed radio local loop) (European Commission (2004). 
Thus spectrum management reform will require dialogue involving all Member States to 
pursue two seemingly contrary goals – a harmonized EU-wide approach with more flexibility 
and ease of assignment. 
EU harmonization of the spectrum has the advantage of organizing a common context for 
future radio e-communications services. This is increasingly important as the EU progresses 
in integration commercially and in lifestyles. New radio services can be expected to expand in 
functions, numbers of users and types of usages. We may expect a far heavier dependence on 
such services by future EU citizens, in the areas from health to supporting complex lifestyles 
and a range of new business usages.  Opening up of EU-wide service markets should be more 
competitive and so more cost efficient for users. Harmonization of spectrum usage also means 
that volume manufacturing can cut the costs of handsets and networking equipment and drive 
towards common user interfaces. 
Harmonization also could reduce the bill to Member States for governance and regulation if 
some of their responsibilities can be handed over to a central EU coordinator. However, there 
are arguments against this that should be taken into account, notably: 
• The national plans for spectrum uses, especially for broadcast public services, which 
may be constrained, although they may be seen as having a social role. However even 
here, the use of common frequency planning across the EU for terrestrial DTV and 
future developments in its definition may benefit all in the long run, as far as audiences 
covered, consumer equipment and possibly consumer confusion. 
• The problems of negotiating with NRAs, and with Member State governments to reduce 
their powers, by effectively handing them over in some areas. 
• Removal of restrictions on spectrum use in terms of technology and service neutrality in 
the EC proposals is a key issue. It could substantially increase the benefits that EU 
industry and society derive from spectrum use. 
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On the question of ‘flexibility’, the requirement for co-existence of multiple allocation 
methods should be considered, the several contenders being: 
• a commons for all, with unlicensed bands, becoming the most important. 
• trading spectrum with a market mechanism, in co-existence with a free commons. 
• collective use in the sense of sustainable interleaving between licensed bands and 
also overlaps with low interference, perhaps with an arrangement of primary and 
secondary users. 
• managed command and control, the designated assignment by the authorities. 
When we examine these various options, the basis for choosing between them is twofold: 
first, the extent to which the method enables real competition and market freedom stimulating 
the innovation that will spur the EU economy in terms of jobs, productivity, revenues and 
overall GDP growth; second, the degree to which the method puts communications at low 
cost into the hands of the citizen.  
This implies ease of entry for the new, for rapid advances in services and their costs as much 
as pure technology. Thus the main criteria choosing between the different allocation methods 
turn on measuring how each encourages: 
• Fast and easy entry for new radio-based services, service providers and technologies 
• Low cost of entry for new service providers and new technology producers 
• Efficient (re)use of spectrum 
• Innovations in technologies, services and business models 
• Neutrality on services or technologies, such that the allocation method does not 
become a barrier to entry to either 
• Minimal regulatory intervention 
• Low cost of management (by regulators). 
Thus although markets and licence auctions seem to be interesting in the light of the above, 
their ability to act as a barrier and to choke off new entrants without deep enough pockets, 
who could introduce more competition and new technology, is less often admitted. The 3G 
UMTS auctions paint a dismal picture here. 
Decisions should driven by economic policy rather than technology or politics, for instance 
when allocating the digital dividend from the analogue TV switchover. In essence there are 
two key questions on the proposed EC spectrum policy, first: 
How well do the proposed measures fit the needs and potential economic success of Europe 
in optimally managing, allocating and using spectrum? 
The answer from reviewing the EC policy documents is - fairly well. The whole subject is 
being taken seriously enough and the various proposals are sound as far as they go. But the 
dialogue is dominated by two considerations: 
• The balance between Member States and the EU over governance – is there a need for 
an EU regulator for harmonized spectrum allocation, and so would policy making and 
implementation be at an EU level, or national level, or both? The proposal by the 
European Commission for a European Telecommunications Market Authority obviously 
prompts the question of whether it could play such a role. Spectrum liberalization is one 
of the few cases that may well justify a ‘necessary centralism’. 
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This would enable a new spectrum framework to be created, which itself requires a 
strong degree of harmonization, to eliminate waste through inconsistent use of 
frequencies across Europe. The European Telecommunications Market Authority, as 
proposed with its power of veto over national regulators, appears to be the logical 
platform for liberalization of the spectrum (and the whole industry) – emphasising 
competition and investments in innovative services and technologies. As such it is the 
place to position an EU coordinator for spectrum allocation, one who must negotiate 
change and migration among the Member States, to organize spectrum harmonization 
across the EU. 
• The move to trading as the only alternative to managed command and control with no 
real consideration of other alternatives. This US-centric view is presumably made for 
reasons of the tax harvests that Member State treasuries anticipate, and also perhaps the 
EC for centrally managed EU-wide auctions. 
The second question is:  
What is missing or needs to be changed?  
Our analysis highlights several missing items: 
• Identification of where each allocation method fits. 
• A scheme for a harmonized approach to releasing spectrum from the military and 
national public services, in terms of inducements to relinquish spectrum and in the 
bands of spectrum released and retained by these public service users. 
• Legal frameworks for shared spectrum in licensed bands. 
• On the technical/regulatory side, the anticipation of more unlicensed bands for a 
commons and agreement on their source. 
Future mobile services and their spectrum requirements are likely to be in two major 
directions. First is the need for more bandwidth to support major expansion in mobile and 
fixed-radio broadband. Second is the expansion of new radio technologies which depend on 
the computer industry model of unfettered communication, of a commons of unlicensed 
bandwidth, with regulation focused on the terminal devices technical specification, à la WiFi. 
Unlicensed spectrum will be the basis for the advanced innovation for ICT products and R&D 
for the next two decades at least. 
We conclude with the principle that future operation of e-communications and entertainment 
radio networks will move more towards Internet access but from a mobile handset. In this 
model, any terminal device may access any radio network in a completely free manner.  
5.2 Recommendations  
Suggestions for the way forward should therefore include: 
• Harmonization of EU spectrum management reform to be pursued immediately – a 
framework for carrying out a comprehensive spectrum management for Europe is 
required. The catalyst would be a central coordinator at EU level, able to facilitate a 
phased transition in spectrum management across the EU. This facilitator should co-
ordinate reforms in concert with NRAs with a registry database of users and uses. The 
facilitator should have sufficient authority to follow through the reforms below, 
appropriate to the responsibility for co-ordination. 
• Technical neutrality – no specification of any technology or standard. A phased 
transition to this is recommended, with time limits and milestones. 
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• Service neutrality – any spectrum band may be used for any application. The notion that 
function of a specified band is fixed for all time should be abandoned, although there 
may be agreements to use several or many associated services in one band, e.g. for TV. 
A phased transition to this is recommended, with time limits and milestones. 
• Far more spectrum progressively built up into a commons of unlicensed bands – note 
that governments may be against this for tax reasons.  This move would accompany a 
change of model of spectrum use – that of unfettered access, similar to the Internet, 
which is not really yet considered in EC policy. 
• Collective spectrum use in the sense of sharing licensed bands, with secondary users, 
who interleave and overlap without interference. 
• Releasing public services and military spectrum to commercial and individual users – 
the way forward in refarming may be to encourage users with financial incentives to sell 
their surplus spectrum as a licence to whomsoever they wish, or place it in the 
unlicensed commons. The former would enable market forces to drive the specific 
frequencies and amount of spectrum available. 
• The digital switchover from analogue to digital TV and the digital dividend as part of 
harmonization should re-apportion large amounts of the spectrum (of the order of 75%) 
to non-broadcast TV applications including mobile and fixed-radio broadband access in 
licensed and unlicensed bands. 
• Reform of institutions for standards and research in Europe, so that failures over IPR, 
standards and technology are not repeated (e.g. UMTS, ERMES, etc). A new R&D 
initiative with a centre of excellence, a European radio research institute would be ideal.  
Its goal would be to pursue open, public research for radio technology and for building 
up global technical standards, establishing an IPR base to avoid the threat of private 
hoarding of key patents. 
• Finally, the European Parliament has a significant role to play in ensuring that the EU 
develops spectrum policy fit for purpose and in light of technological progress and 
market development. This of course includes its traditional role in amending or, if 
necessary, rejecting legislation. Beyond this, the European Parliament is ideally placed 
to highlight the importance of spectrum policy through raising the profile and level of 
the debate on this topic through the use of, for instance, non-binding resolutions, 
committee hearings, written declarations, and so on. The topic is complex but it is 
crucially important that Europe’s citizens understand its importance. 
 
IP/A/ITRE/ST/2007-04
 
                        Page 66 of 69
 
                           PE 393.521
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Airvana (2007) ‘Femtocells: overview’, presentation at Mobile Broadband, October 2007. 
Analysys et al (2004) Study on Conditions and Options in Introducing Secondary Trading of Radio Spectrum 
in the European Community, Final Report for the European Commission, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/radio_spectrum/activities/studies/index_e
n.htm 
Aral, S. et al (2006) ‘Which came first, IT or productivity? The virtuous cycle of investment and use in 
enterprise systems’, presentation to the 27th International Conference on Information 
Systems, Milwaukee, http://ssrn.com/abstract=942291  
Benkler, Y. (2002) ‘Some economics of wireless communications’, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, 
Vol 16, No 1, Fall, pp. 25-83, available at http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v16/ 
16HarvJLTech025.pdf 
Benzoni, L. et al 
(1993) 
The Economics of Radio Frequency Allocation, ICCP #33, OECD, Paris. 
Bohlin, E. et al 
(2006b) 
Mapping European Wireless Trends and Drivers, Report No 22250 EN, IPTS, Seville, 
http://www.jrc.es/publications/pub.cfm?prs=1428 
Bohlin, E. et al 
(2006a) 
‘Telecoms infrastructure to 2030’, in Infrastructure to 2030: Telecom, Land Transport, 
Water and Electricity, OECD, Paris. 
Coase, R. (1959)  ‘The Federal Communications Commission’, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 2, 
October. 
Dettmer, R. 2005) ‘Up the revolution’, IEE Review, May 2005. 
Doeven, J. (2007) ‘Implementation of the digital dividend: technical constraints to be taken into account’, 
EBU Technical Review, January. 
Europe Economics 
(2006) 
Economic Impact of the Use of Radio Spectrum in the UK, study for Ofcom, 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/research/radiocomms/reports/economic_spectrum_use/ 
European Commission 
(2002) 
Decision No 676/2002/EC on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the 
European Community (Radio Spectrum Decision), adopted 7 March 2002. 
European Commission 
(2004) 
Communication on A market-based approach to spectrum management in the EU, 
COM(2005)400 final, 14 September 2005. 
European Commission 
(2007a) 
Communication on Rapid access to spectrum for wireless electronic communications 
services through more flexibility (COM/2007)50 final), 8 February 2007. 
European Commission 
(2007b) 
Decision 2007/344/EC on harmonized availability of information regarding spectrum 
use within the Community, adopted 16 May 2007. 
European Parliament 
(2007) 
Resolution, Towards a European policy on the radio spectrum (2006/2212(INI)), 
P6_TA(2007)0041, 14 February 2007 
Forge, S. (2004) ‘Is fourth generation mobile Nirvana or… nothing?’ info, Vol 6, No 1, August 
Forge, S. et al (2006) ‘Spectrum for the next radio revolution: the economic and technical case for collective 
use’, info, Vol 8, No 2. 
Forge, S. et al (2005) The Demand for Future Mobile Communications Markets and Services in Europe, 
Report No 21673 EN, IPTS, Seville, http://www.jrc.es/publications/pub.cfm?id=1278 
Forge, S. et al (2007) The Mobile Provide: Economic Impacts of Alternative Uses of the Digital Dividend, 
SCF Associates, Princes Risborough, available at http://digitaldividend.eu 
Geiss, A. (2004) Issues of Spectrum Policy Relevant to the Civil/ Military Relationship, presentation to 
CEPT/ FM Civil/Military Meeting, Brest, 23-25 March, 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/radio_spectrum/docs/ref_docs/speeches/c
ivil_military.ppt. 
Hatfield, D. (2005) ‘Spectrum management reform and the notion of the spectrum commons’, Southern 
African Journal of Information and Communication, Vol 4, Spring, available at 
http://link.wits.ac.za/journal/j0401-hatfield-spectrum.pdf  
 
IP/A/ITRE/ST/2007-04
 
                        Page 67 of 69
 
                           PE 393.521
Hazlett, T. (2001) ‘The wireless craze, the unlimited bandwidth myth, the spectrum auction faux pas, and 
the punchline to Ronald Coase’s ‘big joke’: an essay on airwave allocation policy’, 
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Vol 14, No 2, Spring, pp. 336-469. 
Indepen et al (2004) An Economic Study to Review Spectrum Pricing, 2004, study for the UK 
Radiocommunications Agency, February. 
ITU (2005) The Internet of Things, ITU, Geneva, 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/publications/internetofthings/ 
Maliranta, M. et al 
(2006) 
‘Informational mobility and productivity: Finnish evidence’, Economics of Innovation 
and New Technology, Vol 15, No 6. 
McHenry, M. (2005) NSF Spectrum Occupancy Measurements Project Summary, Shared Spectrum 
Company, Vienna, VA.  
Mott MacDonald et al 
(2006) 
Study on Legal, Economic & Technical Aspects of ‘Collective Use’ of Spectrum in the 
European Community, report for the Radio Spectrum Policy Unit (RSPU) of DG 
Information Society & Media, November. 
NERA (1995) The Economic Impact of the Use of Radio in the UK, Report for the 
Radiocommunications Agency. 
Open Spectrum UK 
(2007) 
Comments for Analysys regarding Ofcom’s Digital Dividend Review’, 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/ddr/responses/nr/open_spectrumuk.pdf 
Ovum (2004) The Economic Contribution of Mobile Services in the European Union Before its 2004 
Expansion, Report to the GSM Association, London. 
Minervini, F. et al 
(2007) 
Spectrum Management and Regulation: Towards a FullFledged Market for Spectrum 
Bands?, University of Macerata, DiSSE, working paper No 7.  
Richards, E. (2007) ‘A central telecoms regulator would hurt Europe’, Financial Times, 30 October,  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3cf4f256-8702-11dc-a3ff-
0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1 
RSPG (2005) Opinion on Wireless Access Policy for Electronic Communications Services 
(WAPECS): A more flexible spectrum management approach, Radio Spectrum Policy 
Group, RSPG Opinion #3, RSPG05-102final, 21 November,  
http://rspg.groups.eu.int/doc/documents/meeting/rspg8/rspg_05_102.pdf 
SCF Associates 
(2006) 
Benchmarking Impacts of EU Policy: Options for Economically Efficient Management 
of Radio Spectrum, Report for DG Information Society & Media, Brussels, December  
Smura, T. et al (2006) ‘Radio spectrum policy in Europe’, in Sakari, L. (ed), Innovation in 
Telecommunications: Proceedings of the Research Seminar on Telecommunications 
Business, http://www.tml.tkk.fi/Opinnot/T-109.7510/2006/Proceedings_2006.pdf 
Srivastava, L. (2006) ‘Radio frequency identification: ubiquity for humanity’, info, Vol 9, No 1. 
Starks, M. (2007) Switching to Digital Television: UK Public Policy and the Market, Intellect Books, 
Bristol, UK 
Sterling, C. (2007) Military Communications, ABC Clio, Santa Barbara, CA. 
Tramont, B. (2005) ‘Remarks of Bryan Tramont’ Spectrum Policy Conference, Guatemala City, Guatemala,  
available from http://cadep.ufm.edu.gt/telecom/ingles/interior.asp?menu=lecturas 
Turton, S. (2007) ‘EU spokesman savages self-serving Ofcom’, PCPRO, 31 October, available at 
http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/134442/eu-spokesman-savages-selfserving-ofcom.html 
Werbach, K. (2004) ‘Supercommons: toward a unified theory of wireless communication’, Texas Law 
Review, Vol 82, pp. 863-973, http://werbach.com/research/supercommons.pdf  
ZetaCast (2007) Review of DTT HD Capacity Issues, An Independent Report Commissioned by Ofcom, 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/dttfuture/report.pdf 
 
IP/A/ITRE/ST/2007-04
 
                        Page 68 of 69
 
                           PE 393.521
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
3G Third Generation Mobile 
AWT Alternative Wireless Technology 
BAN Body Area Network 
CATV Cable television 
CDMA Code Division Multiple Access 
CEPT Conference Européenne des administrations des Postes et des Télécommunications 
CR Cognitive Radio 
DSL Digital Subscriber Line 
EBU European Broadcasting Union 
ERT Emerging Wireless Technology 
Flash OFDM Flash Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GPRS General Packet Radio Service 
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications (originally Groupe Spécial Mobile) 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
IPR Intellectual Property Rights 
IPv6 Internet Protocol Version 6 
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network 
ISV Independent Software Vendor 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
MAN Metropolitan Area Network 
MMS Multimedia Messaging Services 
MIMO Multiple In Multiple Out 
MNO Mobile Network Operator 
MS Member State 
NFC Near Field Communication 
NICs Newly Industrialised Countries 
NRA National Regulatory Authority 
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network 
RFID Radio Frequency Identification 
RSPG Radio Spectrum Policy Group 
SMS Short Message Service 
SDR Software Defined Radio 
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
UWB Ultra Wide Band 
VAR Value Added Reseller 
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol 
W-CDMA Wideband Code-Division Multiple-Access 
WiBro Wireless Broadband 
WiFi Wireless Fidelity 
WISP Wireless Internet Service Provider 
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network 
WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access 
xDSL Refers collectively to all types of digital subscriber lines 
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